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Creative Destruction: Copyright’s
Fair Use Doctrine and
the Moral Right of Integrity
Cathay Y. N. Smith*

Abstract
This Paper explores the role of copyright’s fair use doctrine as
a limit on the moral right of integrity. The moral right of integrity
gives an author the right to prevent any distortion, modification, or
mutilation of their work that prejudices their honor or reputation.
Actions that have been found to violate an author’s moral right of
integrity include, for instance, altering a mural by painting clothing
over nude figures, selling separated panels of a single work of art,
and displaying sculptures with holiday ribbons. At the same time,
copyright’s fair use doctrine allows follow-on creators to transform
original works by altering the original work with new expression,
meaning, or message. While the federal Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990 (VARA) includes language explicitly making the right of integrity “[s]ubject to” copyright’s fair use doctrine under § 107, there
have been no decisions in the United States interpreting how the
doctrine might apply to a moral right of integrity claim. The lack of
* Associate Professor, University of Montana Blewett School of Law. Thanks to Sarah Burstein
and Andrew Gilden for their thoughtful review and feedback of an earlier draft of this Paper; Bob
Brauneis, Dmitry Karshtedt, Matthew Sipe, John Whealan, and the George Washington University
Law School IP Speaker Series for inviting me to discuss this Paper; Carys Craig, James Gibson, Marc
Greenberg, Leah Chan Grinvald, Mark Lemley, Joe Miller, Betsy Rosenblatt, Jennifer Rothman, and
Pamela Samuelson for their comments at the 2018 IPSC at the University of California Berkeley Law;
and Laura Pedraza-Farina, Aman Gebru, Paul Guliuzza, Peter Karol, Dmitry Karshtedt, Guy Rub, Ana
Rutschman, and Joy Y. Xiang for their valuable feedback at JIPSA Workshop 2018 hosted by the
Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. Finally, thank you to the hardworking student editors at Pepperdine Law Review.
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case law interpreting how courts might balance an author’s moral
right of integrity with the public’s rights to expression is particularly
troubling in light of the ongoing discussion to expand moral rights
in the United States. If moral rights are to be expanded, most interest- or industry-groups and commentators agree that those rights
must be subject to fair use. However, without any guidance from
courts, and with commentators and legislative history doubting the
compatibility of fair use with the right of integrity, how can the
United States expand moral rights with the assumption that fair use
would provide the proper balance between authors’ rights and the
public’s rights? This Paper illustrates different contexts in visual
art where a follow-on creator distorts, mutilates, or modifies an author’s work in order to make an artistic, social, or political statement, and how the doctrine of fair use might limit the moral right of
integrity in those contexts. It argues that copyright’s fair use doctrine can serve as a limitation on an author’s moral right of integrity
and illustrates how the four fair use factors in § 107 may be used to
balance the author’s right of integrity with the public’s rights to find
fair use where a follow-on creator modifies, distorts, or mutilates an
author’s work to transform the work and give the work new meaning.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The standoff appeared overnight.1 A sculpture of a slight girl facing the
famed Wall Street Charging Bull sculpture.2 Her hands on her hips, her ponytail flowing in the breeze, her eyes staring fearlessly at the Charging Bull.3
The girl’s face is slightly upturned in defiance or pride or, more practically,
to fully face the Charging Bull, which is a few feet taller than the girl.4 The
Fearless Girl, as she was called, immediately became a cause célèbre.5 Many
embraced her and the message she displayed: of gender equality and “the
power of women in leadership.”6 Others criticized her as being a publicity
stunt for the financial firm that commissioned her creation and one that reinforced “corporate feminism” instead of true gender equality.7 One person who
objected to the standoff between Fearless Girl and Charging Bull was the
artist who created the Charging Bull sculpture almost thirty years ago, Arturo
Di Modica.8 Through his attorney, Di Modica claimed that Fearless Girl violated his intellectual property rights, including his moral right of integrity in
Charging Bull.9 He claimed that Fearless Girl changed the positive message
of Charging Bull from one of optimism and showing “the strength and power
of the American people”10 after the 1987 stock market crash, to a negative
message connoting antifeminism and suppression of gender equality.11 But
1. See Sandra E. Garcia, ‘Fearless Girl’ Statute Finds a New Home: At the New York Stock Exchange, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/nyregion/fearless-girlstatue-stock-exchange-.html.
2. See Cara Marsh Sheffler, The ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Sums Up What’s Wrong with Feminism
Today, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/14/fearless-girl-statue-whats-wrong-feminism-today.
3. See Garcia, supra note 1.
4. See Sarah Cascone, From ‘Charging Bull’ to the Bull Market: ‘Fearless Girl’ Heads to the
New York Stock Exchange, ARTNET NEWS (Apr. 19, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/fearlessgirl-new-york-stock-exchange-1269851.
5. See Garcia, supra note 1.
6. See Garcia, supra note 1.
7. Sheffler, supra note 2.
8. ‘Charging Bull’ Sculptor Says New York’s ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Violates His Rights,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/12/charging-bull-newyork-fearless-girl-statue-copyright-claim.
9. Id.
10. Harrison Jacobs, Millions of People from all over the World have Visited this New York Statue
– Here’s Why, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-wallstreet-charging-bull-new-york-city-2017-12.
11. James Barron, Wounded by ‘Fearless Girl,’ Creator of ‘Charging Bull’ Wants Her to Move,
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what rights does an artist have to preserve the message in his art? This Paper
examines the role of copyright’s fair use doctrine12 as a limit on an author’s
moral right of integrity.13
The moral right of integrity gives an author the right to prevent or object
to any distortion, mutilation, modification, or derogatory action to an author’s
work that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.14 Authors retain
their moral rights in their works even if they no longer retain the physical copy
of the work or the copyright to the work.15 Actions that violate an author’s
moral right of integrity outside of the United States include, for instance, using
a film character for promotional purposes “contrary to the spirit of the
[film],”16 “present[ing] a fictional work as a biographical work,”17 altering a
mural by painting clothing on nude figures,18 separately selling panels of a
single work of art,19 and tying and displaying holiday ribbons on sculptures.20
In the United States, the only federal law that explicitly grants authors the
moral right of integrity is the federal Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA), which gives authors the right “to prevent the intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification” of their single-copy or limited-edition

N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/nyregion/charging-bull-sculpturewall-street-fearless-girl.html?_r=0.
12. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
13. See id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
14. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886,
123 L.N.T.S. 233, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne
Convention] (entered into force in U.S. Mar. 1, 1989).
15. Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-law Basis for the Protection of the
Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (distinguishing moral rights from other property
protections on the basis “that works of art are expressions of the creative personality of the author, and
insofar as these works continue to embody the author’s personality, acts done to them that impair his
or her ability accurately to reflect the authors personality should be actionable”).
16. Maree Sainsbury, Parody, Satire, Honour and Reputation: The Interplay Between Economic
and Moral Rights, 18 AIPJ 149, 159 (2007) (discussing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal],
Paris, com., Sept. 8, 2004, No. 04/09673, where director and producer of The Fifth Element successfully sued an advertising company for using a character from the film in an advertisement for Vodafone Live).
17. Id. (citing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris, com., May 29, 2002).
18. John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1038 n.56
(1976) (discussing Reichsgericht [RG] [court of last resort for civil and criminal matters] June 8, 1912,
79 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 397 (Ger.)).
19. Id. at 1023 (citing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris, May 30. D. Jur 1962
570).
20. Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982), 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.).
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works of visual art21 that would prejudice their “honor or reputation.”22 Unlike most other nations’ moral rights legislation, VARA explicitly includes
language making the right of integrity “[s]ubject to” copyright law’s § 107
fair use provision.23 However, no court in the United States has decided a fair
use defense to a moral rights claim, and a number of commentators have expressed doubt about the compatibility of fair use with moral rights.24
This Paper argues that the moral right of integrity should be limited by
fair use. Specifically, this Paper examines different contexts where follow-on
creators distort, mutilate, or modify an author’s work to give the work new
meaning or to express a political, social, or artistic message. Where the social
benefit of these transformative secondary uses and the free expression of follow-on creators outweigh the harm to the author’s honor or reputation, fair
use should excuse the follow-on creators from liability arising under the moral
right of integrity.25 In the United States, these contexts may extend to instances where a follow-on creator uses an author’s limited-edition work of
visual art.26 In limited instances, fair use may even extend to the distortion,
mutilation, or modification of an author’s original work of visual art.27
The purpose of this Paper is not to recommend a new defense to moral
rights.28 As noted above, the text of VARA already explicitly recognizes a
fair use defense.29 This Paper is also not setting out to fix fair use or to advo-

21. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘work of visual art’ is a . . . a painting,
drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy [or] in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer . . . .”).
22. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012).
23. Id. § 106A(a).
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. See infra Part V; see also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bill
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612–13 (2d Cir. 2006)) (finding that the
second factor, “nature of the copyrighted work,” of the four-factor fair use determination applied with
less force where one artist uses another artist’s work in a transformative manner to comment on her
image’s social and aesthetic meaning rather than to exploit its creative virtues).
26. See Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 83–85, 122–23 (1996) (arguing that an artist’s work mutilating a
hypothetical limited-edition Mona Lisa by adding a mustache to it could be protected by fair use as a
parody).
27. See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 281–82 (2009) (discussing an art critic who found that the mutilation of an original work had “become essential to the
work”).
28. See infra Part II.
29. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
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cate for an expansion of moral rights, nor is it meant to critique courts’ applications or misapplications of the fair use factors under § 107 in copyright infringement claims.30 Instead, this Paper contemplates how the defense of fair
use—as it is currently interpreted and applied in copyright infringement
claims—should limit an author’s moral right of integrity claim without having
to restrict the scope of fair use to give the moral right of integrity meaning.31
While the analysis in this Paper will help clarify application of fair use to
integrity claims and, hopefully, encourage litigants and courts to look more
closely at fair use as a plausible defense in moral rights litigation, its purpose
extends further.32 The analysis in this Paper will also help inform ongoing
discussions on the expansion of moral rights in the United States and that expansion’s potential implications on free expression.33 As explained below,
the U.S. Copyright Office recently undertook a study to explore the possible
expansion of moral rights, and the creative industry raised First Amendment
concerns in response to possible expansion of moral rights in the United
States.34 Indeed, if the United States were to expand the coverage of moral
rights to include literary texts, musical works, or other mass-produced items
like other civil- and common-law countries currently do, understanding fair
use and how it balances authors’ rights of integrity with follow-on creators’
and the public’s rights to expression is important to ensure that expression is
not chilled.
Part II of this Paper offers a brief introduction to the moral right of integrity, its applications in visual arts cases in the United States under VARA, and
the ongoing pressure to expand its scope and subject matter in the United
States.35 Part III discusses fair use and addresses arguments that fair use is
incompatible with the moral right of integrity.36 Part IV analyzes different
instances that could violate the moral right of integrity, and how fair use would
apply in each context.37 To help illustrate the flexibility of fair use, these contexts include, for instance, where a defendant distorts, mutilates, or modifies

30. See infra Parts III–IV.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Parts IV–V.
33. See infra Section II.B.
34. See infra Section II.B; Study on the Moral Rights of Attribution and Integrity, 82 Fed. Reg.
7870 (Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Moral Rights Study].
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part IV.
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the meaning of an author’s work without physically altering the work;38 where
a defendant distorts, mutilates, or modifies an author’s work by physically—
but temporarily or impermanently—altering the work;39 and where a defendant permanently distorts, mutilates, or modifies the physical copy of an author’s work in order to make an artistic, social, or political statement.40 This
Paper concludes that recognizing a fair use limitation to right of integrity
claims is important to ensure free expression is not stifled under the pretext of
protecting an author’s honor or reputation.41
II. THE MORAL RIGHT OF INTEGRITY
Moral rights protect an author’s personality, honor, and soul in their
work.42 Moral rights are often described as non-economic rights, which are
independent from the copyright or property right in a work; in other words, an
author retains their moral rights to their work even after transferring the work
or copyright in the work to another person.43 Moral rights originated in nineteenth-century Europe, but have since been adopted by many civil- and common-law countries to protect authors’ rights of integrity and attribution to their
expressive works.44 Moral rights legislation typically protects the moral rights
38. See infra Section IV.A.
39. See infra Section IV.B.
40. See infra Section IV.C.
41. See infra Part V.
42. See Sonya G. Bonneau, Honor and Destruction: The Conflicted Object in Moral Rights Law,
87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 47, 49 (2013).
43. See id. at 52 (describing moral rights theory and stating, “moral rights are non-economic, inalienable rights that transcend the economic formalities of sale”); Berne Convention, supra note 14, 25
U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object
to any distortion, mutilation[,] or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.”).
44. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 4, §§ 80(1), 80(2)(b) (Eng.) (“The author
of a copyright literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, and the director of a copyright film, has the
right . . . not to have his work subjected to derogatory treatment. . . . [T]he treatment of a work is
derogatory if it amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to the honour
or reputation of the author or director . . . .”); Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, ss. 14.1(1), 28.2
(Can.) (“The author of a work has . . . the right to the integrity of the work . . . . “The author’s . . . right
to the integrity of a work . . . is infringed only if the work . . . is, to the prejudice of its author’s . . . honour or reputation, (a) distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified . . . .”); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt
IX div 4 s 195AI–AK (Austl.) (“The author of a work has a right of integrity of authorship in respect
of the work. The author’s right is the right not to have the work subjected to derogatory treatment. . . . [D]erogatory treatment . . . means: (a) the doing, in relation to the work, of anything that
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of authors of literary, dramatic, artistic, musical, and audio-visual works.45
These moral rights generally grant authors control over their works by giving
them the right of attribution, the right of disclosure and withdrawal, and the
right of integrity.46 The right of attribution grants authors the right to claim
authorship of their work and the right to publish their work anonymously or
pseudonymously.47 The right of disclosure and withdrawal grants authors the
sole discretion to decide when their work is released to the public and whether
to remove their work from the public.48 Finally, the right of integrity gives an
author the right to prevent the alteration, distortion, or mutilation of their
work, even after the author transfers or sells the work or copyright to the
work.49 This Paper focuses on the moral right of integrity.
The moral right of integrity is concerned with preserving the dignity and
personhood of the author.50 Commentators tend to justify the moral right of
integrity by presenting work as an expression of an author’s personality or an
“expression of his innermost being,”51 because “an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit into the work.”52 Therefore, when another person distorts, mutilates, or misrepresents the work, they “mistreat[] an expression of
the artist’s personality, affects his artistic identity, personality, and honor.”53
As Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli explained, the physical alteration of
an artist’s work, or the prejudicial display of their work, can cause “personal
anguish [to] the artist,” because “an artist may identify with his works as with

results in a material distortion of, the mutilation of, or a material alteration to, the work that is prejudicial to the author’s honour or reputation . . . . [I]n relation to an artistic work, [derogatory treatment]
means . . . an exhibition in public of the work that is prejudicial to the author’s honour or reputation
because of the manner or place in which the exhibition occurs . . . .”).
45. See supra note 44.
46. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 356 (2006).
Some countries further recognize an author’s moral right to have access to the original work, to compel
the completion of a work, and to prevent their work from being associated with undesirable products
or institutions. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY: EXAMINING
MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2019). These are much more limited and are sometimes
considered an “extension” of moral rights. Id. at 14 n. 51.
47. Rigamonti, supra note 46, at 364.
48. Id. at 362.
49. See id. at 364.
50. See Yonover, supra note 26, at 112.
51. JOHN MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 423 (5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
MERRYMAN ET AL.].
52. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
53. Merryman, supra note 18, at 1027.
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his children: prize them for their present character and not want that character
changed. Or he may be trying to communicate something to others, whether
they want to receive the message or not.”54 Roberta Kwall explains that the
right of integrity functions “to safeguard the author’s meaning and message,
and thus [is] designed to increase an author’s ability to safeguard the integrity
of her texts.”55 Some commentators believe that “mistreat[ing] the work of
art is to mistreat the artist”; they view the moral right of integrity as a right of
personhood for the artist.56 Others see moral rights as a way to preserve significant works for the public, finding “the moral right of the artist . . . [as] a
method of providing for private enforcement of this public interest.”57 More
view moral rights as an anti-defamation law to protect artists’ reputation and
honor; as Joseph Sax explained, “‘One of the primary misconceptions regarding the French concept of droit moral is the assumption that it seeks to protect
the public interest by preserving artworks for posterity.’ It does not.”58
There are various ways in which an author’s right to integrity may be
violated. For instance, the French artist Bernard Buffett painted a composition
on a refrigerator, covering all six panels of the refrigerator with art, including
the front, top, and sides of the refrigerator.59 The art consisted of a plate of
food, a fish, a pedestal tray, and a vase with foliage in Buffet’s signature expressionist style.60 A Paris gallery exhibited Buffet’s refrigerator and other
refrigerators decorated by famous artists in its Nobility of Every Day Objects
exhibition in 1958.61 The artist considered the six panels to be one single work
54. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 102 (1997).
55. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW
FOR THE UNITED STATES 6 (1999).
56. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 423.
57. Merryman, supra note 18, at 1041.
58. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL
TREASURES 22 (1999); see also Cathay Y. N. Smith, Community Rights to Public Art, 90 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 369, 407 (2016) (“Moral rights—or droit moral—protect an artist’s personality, integrity, and
reputation in her art. Moral rights are rights that belong to the artist, so they do not protect the public’s
interest in the art.”).
59. Merryman, supra note 18, at 1023.
60. John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 12 STAN. L. 5, 5 (1977),
https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Stanford_Lawyer_issue-19_1977SPRING-VOL12-NO1_front.pdf (picturing and describing a painting of a refrigerator by Bernard Buffet).
61. Paris 'Frige' is Worth a Fortune, ALAMY, https://www.alamy.com/jun-26-1958-paris-frige-isworth-a-fortune-a-paris-gallery-is-now-image69352322.html (showing image of Bernard Buffet’s refrigerator at a Paris gallery in “Nobility of Every Day Objects” in 1958).
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of art and signed only one of the panels before auctioning the refrigerator at a
charity auction.62 Six months after the auction, one of the painted panels appeared in the auction catalogue for another sale.63 The separated panel, which
was listed for sale independently from the rest of the work, was titled Still Life
with Fruits by Bernard Buffet and described as “a painting on metal.”64 After
discovering the impending sale of the work, Buffet brought a right of integrity
action against the owner of the refrigerator to prevent him from separately
selling the single panel.65 Buffet argued that to separate one panel of the work,
and to treat it as a separate and independent work, distorted and misrepresented his artistic intention and violated his right to integrity in his work.66
The French court agreed.67 The court allowed the owner of the refrigerator to
keep and enjoy the work or transfer the entire composition, but the court enjoined the owner from separating the work and disposing of it piece-bypiece.68
In Germany, the owner of a house commissioned an artist to create a mural on his wall.69 The mural included nude figures.70 The owner of the house
was offended by the nudity and hired another artist to paint clothing onto the
nudes.71 The original artist complained that this violated his moral right of
integrity in his art and sued the owner.72 The German court agreed with the
artist.73 Another case in Germany involved a defendant who added customized frames to artworks, which extended the patterns of the artworks onto the
frames.74 The court in that case held that this violated the artist’s right of
integrity.75 In Sweden, the Stockholm District Court found an artist’s moral

62. Merryman, supra note 18, at 1023.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1027.
67. Id. at 1023.
68. Id. at 1023 n.1, 1027.
69. Id. at 1038 n.56 (discussing Reichsgericht [RG] [court of las resort for civil and criminal matters] June 8, 1912, 79 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 397 (Ger.)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Rigamonti, supra note 46, at 365–66 (discussing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice], 150 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 32 (F.R.G.).
75. Id. at 366.
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right of integrity to be violated when his work was exhibited next to highly
pornographic photographs.76 This placement, the court found, modified the
context of the author’s work and “prejudiced the author’s reputation or individuality.”77 In France, a court held that a defendant’s unauthorized use of
Jean Lurçat’s, a French tapestry artist, works for advertising violated his moral
right of integrity.78
In Belgium, Johan Deckmyn, from the Flemish nationalist political party
Vlaams Belang, created copies of a calendar to hand out to party supporters.79
The cover of the calendar was based on the cover of the Spike and Suzy comic
“De Wilde Weldoener,” but with a xenophobic message.80 Specifically,
Deckmyn replaced the main character with an image of the mayor of Ghent
throwing money into a crowd and replaced the crowd in the background with
characters wearing headscarves collecting the money.81 The heirs of Willy
Vandersteen, the author of Spike and Suzy, sued Deckmyn for copyright infringement and violation of the moral right of integrity.82 The Civil Court of
the Court of First Instance in Brussels enjoined Deckmyn from distributing
the infringing calendars.83
In Canada, the artist of Flight Stop—a hanging sculpture consisting of
sixty flying geese—sued the owner of the work for displaying the work with
76. Jonas Brown-Pedersen, The Inadequacy of UK Moral Rights Protection: A Comparative Study
on the Waivability of Rights and Recontexualisation of Works in Copyright and Droit D’auteurs Systems, 3 LSE L. REV. 115, 127 (2018).
77. Id.
78. Rigamonti, supra note 46, at 366; Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 4e ch.,
June 6, 1978, 99. RIDA 1979, 165 (Fr.).
79. Magdalena Jozwiak, No Laughing Matter: The Right to Parody in EU Copyright Law (Case
Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, C-201/13,) EUROPEAN L. BLOG (Sept. 25, 2014), http://europeanlawblog.eu/2014/09/25/no-laughing-matter-the-right-to-parody-in-eu-copyright-law-case-deckmyn-vvandersteen-c-20113/.
80. Id.
81. Id.; Alain Strowel, ‘Parody’ Becomes a Concept of EU Law: Something to Applaud or to
Fear?, IPDIGIT (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.ipdigit.eu/2014/11/parody-becomes-a-concept-of-eu-lawsomething-to-applaud-or-to-fear/.
82. Jozwiak, supra note 79.
83. Id. The Court of Appeal in Brussels referred questions of interpreting the defense of parody
to the European Court of Justice. Id. In September 2014, the European Court of Justice did not explicitly address whether the facts of this case would fall under a parody defense, but did caution that
the application of the parody defense “must strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests
and rights of [authors and artists] . . . and, on the other, the freedom of expression of the user of a
protected work who is relying on the exception for parody.” C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, 2014, E.C.J. 27, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text
=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=157281&occ=first&dir=&cid=198445.
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red holiday ribbons around the geese’s necks.84 The artist, Michael Snow, felt
that the addition of the ribbons “jarred the harmony of his naturalistic composition, altered its basic character and purpose, and ultimately affected his artistic reputation.”85 In addition to the artist’s own statement that the ribbons
prejudiced his honor and reputation, experts testified that the red ribbons on
Snow’s sculpture made “a mockery of its intended purpose” and transformed
the work “into a ‘kitschy’ sentimental display, resembling a Christmas bauble.”86 Snow sued Eaton Centre, and the Canadian court ordered the Centre
to remove the red ribbons.87
These cases represent the potential strength of the moral right of integrity
to authors and visual artists, allowing authors and artists to preserve the meaning and message in their works.88 In its most expansive form, the moral right
of integrity allows an author, or their heirs, to not only reject actual physical
modifications of the author’s work, but also contextual modifications of the
author’s work that places the work into a context different from what the author intended—even if the modification leaves the work physically untouched
and intact.89 In the United States, however, authors’ moral rights of integrity
are limited to those granted under VARA.90

84. Sophie Eastwood, Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105, UNIV.
CAMBRIDGE: CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. & INFO. L. (July 2015), https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/virtual-museum/snow-v-eaton-centre-ltd-1982-70-cpr-2d-105.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.; Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.).
88. See supra notes 59–87 and accompanying text.
89. Rigamonti, supra note 46, at 365 (“[T]he general rule is that any and all substantive modifications are prohibited. This prohibition . . . applies to contextual modifications that leave the substance
of the work intact, but that change the appearance or perception of the work by putting it into a context
that differs from the one originally intended or envisioned by the author.”).
90. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. Certain states, including California and New
York, have legislated state moral rights. See California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987
(West 2012); Artists’ Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 14.03 (McKinney 2012). For
instance, the California Art Preservation Act prevents the public display of works of fine art that have
been physically defaced, mutilated, altered, or destroyed. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.07; CIV.
CODE § 987. New York’s Artists’ Authorship Rights Act prohibits the unauthorized public display,
publication or reproduction of a work of fine art “in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form.”
See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08. This Article will not address state law rights.
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A. The Moral Right of Integrity Under VARA
In the United States, VARA is the only federal law explicitly protecting
the moral rights of authors.91 Authors’ rights under VARA are narrower than
its counterparts in other common- or civil-law jurisdictions such as Europe,
Australia, and Canada.92 For one, VARA only grants to authors the right of
attribution, the right of integrity, and the right to prevent the destruction of
works of recognized stature.93 VARA only protects the moral rights of authors
that create one type of work: works of visual art.94 This excludes other works
of authorship, such as literary, dramatic, musical, and audio-visual works.95
VARA also limits its protection to single copies or limited-edition copies of
visual art works; specifically, it defines “work[s] of visual art” as paintings,
drawings, prints, sculptures, or still photographic images produced for exhibition purposes, “existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies

91. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 59–60. Other federal laws that could protect
moral rights of authors include § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which had been asserted against defendants
who failed to “properly credit an author or edit[ed] an author’s work without permission ‘into a form
that departs substantially from the original work.’” Id. at 40 (footnote omitted). These potential claims
under § 43(a) were significantly narrowed, but not completely foreclosed, by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). See
generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 40–58. Section 1202 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act also provides some moral rights protection by prohibiting the removal, alteration, or
falsification of certain copyright management information, such as the author. 17 U.S.C. § 1202
(2012). Finally, copyright’s derivative works rights also grant authors the right to prevent the unauthorized modification of their copyrighted works. Id. § 106(2).
92. See infra notes 235–38; see also U.S. COPYRIGHTS OFFICE, supra note 46, at 11–12.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. Courts sometimes consider the right to prevent the destruction of works of
recognized stature as a standalone right separate from the right of integrity. See Carter v. Helmsley
Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (“In some jurisdictions the integrity right also protects artwork from destruction.”(emphasis added)) Others consider it an add-on right to the right of integrity.
See id. This Paper separates the right to prevent destruction of a work of recognized stature from the
right of integrity. See infra Part IV. Destruction is not the same as distortion, mutilation, modification,
because the total destruction of a work does not prejudice the honor or reputation of an artist. See
Carter, 71 F.3d at 81–82 (“[D]estruction is seen as less harmful than the continued display of deformed
or mutilated work that misrepresents the artist and destruction may proceed.”). Indeed, once the work
is destroyed, it is no longer on public display in a way that may be contrary to the author’s intent, and
the distortion, mutilation, or modification cannot be attributed to the author. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text (explaining that the physical alteration or prejudicial display of an artist’s work
can cause them anguish). While the destruction of a work may disadvantage the artist because their
work no longer exists, it does not cause the artist to be viewed in a different or negative light. See
Carter, 71 F.3d at 81–82.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
95. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 61–62.
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or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered.”96
Once an author’s work qualifies as a work of visual art under VARA’s
moral right of integrity, that author has the right “to prevent any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification” of their work that would prejudice their “honor or reputation.”97 In other words, the moral right of integrity
that VARA grants to authors is subject to certain exceptions.98 For one, authors can affirmatively waive their moral right of integrity.99 Any modifications of the work due to “the passage of time or the inherent nature of the
materials” or as a “result of conservation . . . of the work” are also an exception to an artist’s right of integrity.100 Finally, under what is commonly referred to as the public presentation exception, VARA excuses from a violation
of the right of integrity any modification of the work that “is the result
of . . . the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the
work.”101
The most common cases to arise under VARA are violations of an artist’s
right to prevent the “destruction of a work of recognized stature.”102 In those
cases, authors have had varying degrees of success with their assertion that
their moral rights were violated by the destruction of their work of recognized
stature.103 For one, many works of visual art are excluded from VARA’s definition of a work of visual art.104 For instance, works of applied art are excluded from VARA’s definition of visual art.105 Therefore, a school bus transformed into a mobile replica of a sixteenth-century Spanish galleon was
excluded from VARA’s protection because it was considered applied art and
not a “work of visual art.”106 Works made for hire are also excluded from
VARA’s protection, such as a large “walk-through sculpture” created and installed in the lobby of a mixed-use building by employees at the direction of
96. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
97. Id. § 06A(a)(3)(A).
98. Id.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . shall have the right to prevent
any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work . . . .”); id. § 106A(e) (“The
rights conferred by subsection (a) may . . . be waived . . . .”).
100. Id. § 106A(c)(1)–(2).
101. Id. § 106A(c)(2).
102. See id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
103. See infra notes 104–09 and accompanying text.
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art”).
105. Id.
106. Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 595 (9th Cir. 2016).
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their employer.107 One court even excluded site-specific art from VARA’s
protection.108 This meant that, because a group of sculptures and stoneworks
were integrated into their surroundings, they were site-specific art that were
not protected by VARA.109 On the other hand, some artists have successfully
asserted a violation of their moral right to prevent the destruction of their
works of recognized stature.110 For instance, just recently, the 5Pointz street
artists succeeded in their VARA claim against a real estate developer who
whitewashed and destroyed their art on the walls of the 5Pointz warehouse.111
Similarly, an artist was successful in his VARA claim against the City of Indianapolis when the City destroyed the artist’s sculpture without providing
the artist with prior notice.112
There have been fewer published decisions under the right of integrity in
the United States. In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Büchel, the artist Christoph Büchel asserted a claim under VARA
for violation of his right of integrity against the Massachusetts Museum of
Contemporary Art (MASS MoCA) arising out of a failed partnership between
the parties.113 The artist and MASS MoCA entered into an agreement to create
and display Büchel’s sculptural work, Training Ground for Democracy.114
MASS MoCA funded the art, it went over budget, and then Büchel refused to
continue the work because of artistic differences between him and the museum.115 According to the artist, MASS MoCA continued to work on Büchel’s
project without his approval.116 Then, instead of destroying the work, MASS
MoCA covered it under a tarp and invited audiences to walk past the covered
work to attend its Made at MASS MoCA exhibit.117 Büchel sued MASS

107. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1995).
108. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that removal of the sculptures and stoneworks are excepted under the public presentation and
finding, instead, that site specific art is not covered under VARA).
109. Id.
110. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
111. Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
112. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 4 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
113. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir.
2010).
114. Id. at 41.
115. Id. at 43–45.
116. Id. at 45.
117. Id. at 46.
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MoCA for violating his right of integrity for continuing to work on his sculptural work without his approval, for displaying his work in an incomplete
state, and for displaying his sculptural work covered with a tarp.118 The court
disagreed that displaying Buchel’s incomplete work and his work covered by
a tarp violated his right of integrity, even though the court surmised that
MASS MoCA’s intent was to criticize Büchel.119 The court, however, denied
MASS MoCA’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether MASS
MoCA violated Büchel’s right of integrity by modifying Training Ground
over Büchel’s objections in a manner that harmed his honor or reputation.120
Many right of integrity cases never get decided on their merits when they
are dismissed on the ground that the author’s work does not meet VARA’s
narrow definition of a work of visual art.121 In Lilley v. Stout, for instance,
photographer Gary Lilley asserted a claim under VARA for violation of his
right of integrity against Renee Stout for Stout’s use of Lilley’s photos in her
art.122 Lilley took several photos of a red room for Stout to use “as studies for
paintings [Stout] planned to create.”123 Stout used six of Lilley’s photographs
to create her work titled Red Room at Five.124 The work consisted of the six
photographs “selected and arranged by [Stout] and placed in a binder with a
red cover and illustration.”125 After the personal relationship between Lilley
and Stout soured, Lilley sued Stout for violating his moral rights of integrity
and attribution.126 Without ruling on whether Stout’s use of Lilley’s photographs in Stout’s art violated Lilley’s moral rights in his photos, the court
found that the photographs were not covered under VARA.127 Specifically,
because Lilley’s photographs were not produced for exhibition purposes, they
did not qualify under VARA’s definition of a work of visual art.128
Similarly, in Kelley v. Chicago Park District, artist Chapman Kelley lost
118. Id.
119. Id. at 62.
120. Id. at 65.
121. See id. at 53 (acknowledging that courts do not discuss the rights that VARA guarantees because the cases are usually resolved on “threshold questions” like “whether the artist’s work is a work
of visual art”).
122. 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2005).
123. Id. at 84 (alteration in original).
124. Id. at 85.
125. Id. (alteration in original).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 89.
128. Id. at 88.
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his right of integrity action against the Chicago Park District because his Wildflower Works did not quality as a work of visual art.129 Kelley was nationally
recognized for his paintings of landscapes and flowers.130 He designed a living art piece for the Chicago Park District’s Grant Park titled Wildflower
Works, which included “48 and 60 species of self-sustaining wildflowers native to the region[,] . . . selected for various aesthetic, environmental, and cultural reasons.”131 “Kelley designed the initial placement of the wildflowers so
they would blossom sequentially, changing colors throughout the growing
season and increasing in brightness towards the center of each ellipse.”132
Twenty years later, in order to make room for the development of a new Millennium Park, the Chicago Park District made changes to Grant Park and reconfigured Wildflower Works by decreasing its size by more than half and
changing the shape of the flower beds from elliptical to rectangle.133 Kelley
sued the Park District for violating his moral right of integrity under VARA
because the Park District’s reconfiguration of Wildflower Works was “an intentional ‘distortion, mutilation, or other modification’ of his work and was
‘prejudicial to his . . . honor or reputation.’”134 Without addressing whether
the Park District’s reconfiguration violated Kelley’s right of integrity, or deciding whether Kelley’s Wildflower Works constituted a “painting or sculpture” covered by VARA, the court held that Wildflower Works was not a
“work of visual art.”135 Specifically, works that are “not subject to copyright
protection” are excluded from the definition of a work of visual art, and the
court found Wildflower Works to not be subject to copyright protection because it was neither authored (by a human) nor fixed in a tangible medium.136
B. The Pressure to Expand the Moral Right of Integrity in the United States
While VARA currently only applies to single-copy or limited-edition
works of visual art and explicitly excludes certain expressive works from its

129. 635 F.3d 290, 306 (7th Cir. 2011).
130. Id. at 291.
131. Id. at 293.
132. Id. at 293.
133. Id. at 294–95.
134. Id. at 295.
135. Id. at 302–06.
136. Id. at 298–99, 304–06. Under the definition of a “work of visual art,” works that are not subject
to copyright protection are excluded. Id.
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subject matter, there has been consistent pressure for the United States to consider expanding and broadening its protection of moral rights of authors.137
Most recently, in response to the Register of Copyrights’, Maria Pallante, recommendation, the Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee requested the U.S. Copyright Office to undertake a public study of moral rights
to determine whether current laws are sufficient to protect the moral rights of
creators.138 In January 2017, the U.S. Copyright Office commenced a formal
study on moral rights, and sought public comment in a notice of inquiry to
assess U.S. law’s recognition and protection of the moral rights of integrity
and attribution for authors.139 In its notice of inquiry, the U.S. Copyright Office sought comment from the public on whether U.S. copyright law should
consider additional moral rights protection and whether VARA has been effective in promoting and protecting the moral rights of authors of visual
works.140 The U.S. Copyright Office further sought input from the public on
whether “stronger protections for . . . the right of integrity implicate the First
Amendment,” and “[i]f so, how should they be reconciled.”141
In response, many interested individuals and interest- and industry-groups
filed comments expressing concerns with an expanded moral rights and its
effect on the United State’s long standing recognition of a strong right to free
expression.142 For instance, the American Association of Law Libraries expressed the concern that expanding moral rights in the United States could
undermine fair use: “Many uses favored by the fair use doctrine, such as satire
and parody, would be undermined if moral rights protections . . . prevented
uses the author regards as derogatory.”143 Similarly the Association of American Publishers (AAP) expressed concern with how an author’s right of integ-

137. See, e.g., Symposium, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, and INTEGRITY: Examining Moral Rights
in the United States, 8 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 1, 2 (2016); KWALL, supra note 55, at 147–65.
138. Moral Rights Study, supra note 34, at 7871. The U.S. Copyright Office published its final
report in April 2019 that concluded “that there is no need for the creation of a blanket moral rights
statute at this time.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46.
139. Moral Rights Study, supra note 34, at 7875.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See infra notes 143–47; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 9.
143. Letter from Emily Feltren, Am. Ass. of L. Libr, to Karyn Temple Clagget, Acting Register of
Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 29, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0021.
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rity would interfere with long-standing fair use and First Amendment precedent.144 Citing the Eleventh Circuit case SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co. as an example, the AAP considered whether Alice Randall’s parody The
Wind Done Gone, which criticized Margaret Mitchell’s classic Gone With the
Wind’s “romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and after
Civil War,” would be excused under fair use had Mitchell’s estate brought a
right of integrity claim against Randall.145 Finally, the Authors Alliance
stressed the importance of recognizing a statutory recognition of fair use to a
right of integrity.146 Specifically,
If Congress granted . . . integrity rights to authors, this would implicate First Amendment rights, interests, and values unless the . . . integrity rights were carefully cabined through limitations and exceptions. Among the limitations and exceptions that could mitigate or
avoid conflict with [the] First Amendment . . . would be a statutory
recognition of fair use as a limitation on the rights, as currently recognized in VARA. A follow-on creator who parodied a well-known
popular song, such as the 2 Live Crew parody of Roy Orbison’s
Pretty Woman, should, for example, be able to avoid liability for violating . . . integrity rights by raising a fair use defense. Critically, . . . integrity rights should not constrain the ability of others to
speak about an author or a work.147
Some commenters believe that it would be easy to reconcile the First
Amendment and right of integrity under fair use.148 As the American Society
of Journalists and Authors stated,
Thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of times, U.S. courts have
reconciled the First Amendment and challenges to the assignment of

144. Letter from Allan Robert Adler, Ass. of Am. Publishers, to Karyn Temple Clagett, Acting
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyrights Office (Mar. 30, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0032.
145. Id. at 8–9.
146. Letter from Pamela Samuelson, President, Brianna Schofield, Executive Director, Authors Alliance, to Karyn Temple Clagett, Acting Register of Copyrights and Director 5 (May 30, 2017) (on
file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0028.
147. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
148. See infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text; see also U.S. COPYRIGHTS OFFICE, supra note
46, at 9.
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economic rights and thorny questions of ‘fair use.’ . . .
We have no reason to anticipate that our courts would have any difficulty integrating protections for the moral rights of authors with the
First Amendment.149
Similarly, the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts expressed
confidence that “concerns about First Amendment rights” relating to an expansion of authors’ right of integrity “can be addressed by the established fair
use doctrine.”150 Specifically, the Kernochan Center stated in its reply comments:
[T]he right of integrity is not inherently in tension with free expression. . . . For example, if altering a work is found ‘fair’ because the
change gives the work ‘new meaning or message,’ as the Second Circuit found in some art appropriation cases, the first author’s ‘honor
or reputation’ remain unscathed precisely because the point is that the
new message is not the first author’s message. To the extent the new
message casts the original message in an unflattering light, that consequence would be no more actionable than would be the fallout from
an unkind book review.151
Others, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), expressed uncertainty over whether and how fair use could limit the moral right of integrity.152 As EFF stated, “The integrity claim in particular contemplates an inherently transformative use that is unlikely to usurp the market for the
original; most such uses are likely fair. Creating a new right could cause
149. Letter from Sherry Beck Paprocki, President, Salley Shannon, past President and Advocacy
Chair, American Society of Journalists and Authors, to U.S. Copyright Office 5 (Mar. 30, 2017) (on
file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0040.
150. Letter from June M. Beck, Executive Director, Jance C. Ginsburg, Faculty Director, Phillippa
S. Leonard, Deputy Director, Kernochan Ctr. for Law., Media and the Arts Columbia Law Sch., to
U.S. Copyright Office 9 (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0042.
151. Letter from June M. Beck, Executive Director, Jance C. Ginsburg, Faculty Director, Phillippa
S. Leonard, Deputy Director, Kernochan Ctr. for Law., Media and the Arts Columbia Law Sch., to
U.S. Copyright Office 11 (May 16, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0054 (footnote omitted).
152. Letter from Kit Walsh & Mitch Stoltz, Electronic Frontier Foundation, to U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 30, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC
-2017-0003-0035.
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courts to restrict the scope of fair use to give the integrity right meaning.”153
The Motion Picture Association of America expressed similar concerns about
the moral right of integrity’s potential to chill expression.154 Specifically, it
stressed:
[I]t is far from clear how . . . a [fair use] defense would operate in
practice. Do proponents mean that if a use of the work itself is fair
under traditional copyright fair use analysis, then there is also a complete defense to a moral rights claim? . . . Would the analysis be conducted using the familiar four factors set forth in § 107? How would
they even apply to a potential moral rights violation? . . . The vast
degree of uncertainty surrounding these questions risks chilling
speech.155
Wendy Gordon warned:
[T]he . . . expanded right of ‘integrity’ poses [a danger] to the fair use
doctrine and the liberty it provides for criticism and parody. The “integrity” right aims to preserve the feelings of an artist, but . . . those
feelings—the distress at seeing one’s work disparaged and altered in
a way that emphasizes its potential flaws—is not something that copyright law is permitted to take into consideration.156
Many of these concerns raised by interest groups regarding expansion of
moral rights were focused on the potential for moral rights expansion to implicate the First Amendment by chilling expression and discouraging creation

153. Id. at 3.
154. Letter from Benjamin S. Scheffner, Senior Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., to U.S. Copyright Office (May 15, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0056.
155. Id. at 9.
156. Letter from Wendy J. Gordon, to U.S. Copyright Office 2–3 (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with
regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0043. Gordon continued on to cite Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994):
This distinction between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement is reflected in the rule that there is no protectable derivative market for criticism. The
market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works
would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators
of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.
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of secondary or follow-on works.157 Many of those comments focused on the
need for any expanded moral rights to be limited by the fair use doctrine, similar to VARA.158 Some even point to VARA’s explicit statutory recognition
of fair use as guidance on the limitation that an expanded moral rights statute
should include. Others expressed doubt that fair use could be compatible with
the moral right of integrity. Even commenters that were not concerned with
an expanded right of integrity’s implications on expression relied on the fact
that courts, through the fair use doctrine, could balance an author’s right of
integrity with a follow-on creator’s free expression right. In fact, in its final
report published in April 2019, the United States Copyright Office admitted:
[M]ore explicit protections for the right[] of integrity . . . in the
United States may create tensions with the fair use doctrine . . . .
....
[However,] any tensions between potential statutory moral rights protections and the fair use doctrine can be overcome through proper
calibration of any statutory framework.159
However, even though VARA is explicitly limited by fair use, there have
been no court decisions involving a fair use defense to a right of integrity
claim and no direction on how fair use would interact with a violation of integrity rights.160 As the United States continues to consider or discuss expanding moral rights to cover, for instance, additional subject matter works such

157. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 28 (“[C]ommenters asked that the [U.S. Copyrights] Office consider the possibility that a right of integrity would impose an additional legal chilling
effect on those publishers, authors, and scholars who critique the work of another author in a way that
may damage the initial author’s reputation.”); e.g., Walsh & Stoltz, supra note 152, at 3; Scheffner,
supra note 154, at 9.
158. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 32 (“Some [commenters] noted that applying
fair use to moral rights protections, as is the case with moral rights afforded under VARA, would keep
a statutory right of attribution or integrity from impinging on uses that courts should deem fair.”); e.g.,
Feltren, supra note 143, at 2.
159. U.S. COPYRIGHTS Office, supra note 46, at 30, 32.
160. But see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 102 (some commenters described Dr. Seuss
Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. “as seeking damages for infringements of economic rights as a ‘backdoor’ way of enforcing otherwise unenforceable
moral rights . . . [that] illustrate the interaction between moral rights/derivative works claims and fair
use”).
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as literary, dramatic, artistic, musical, and audio-visual works, or reproductions and mass-produced works, the question of how fair use might limit the
moral right of integrity must be resolved.161 In light of the ongoing discussion
about expanding moral rights in the United States, the accompanying concern
with its implications on free expression, and the current lack of any U.S. court
decision on a fair use defense to a moral rights claim, the analysis in this Paper
contributes to this important and timely discussion.
III. FAIR USE
VARA begins with the limitation “[s]ubject to section 107,” which creates a fair use defense to VARA claims.162 In spite of this specific fair use
limitation in VARA, no court has yet adjudicated a fair use defense to a moral
rights claim.163 Owing its origins to Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v.
Marsh in the mid-nineteenth century,164 § 107 of the Copyright Act sets forth
four factors for a court to weigh to determine whether a defendant’s unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s work is fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the [defendant’s] use[;] . . . (2) the
nature of the [plaintiff’s] work; (3) the amount and substantiality of
the portion [defendant] used in relation to the [plaintiff’s] work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the [defendant’s] upon the potential market for or value of the [plaintiff’s] work.165
Courts have balanced, weighed, and applied those four factors in a number of
infringement cases to excuse, for instance, defendants who copied authors’
works for parody or criticism,166 used authors’ expressions to communicate
new messages,167 and adapted authors’ works for purposes of creating new
161. See infra Part III; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 63 (discouraging the
expansion of artworks, such as musical works and sound recordings, protected under VARA because
the expansion “would contradict the purpose of VARA”).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
163. See infra Section III.B.
164. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
166. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–94 (1994); Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264–65, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2001); Leibovitz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 112–17 (2d Cir. 1998).
167. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod.’s, 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel,
Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 321–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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artistic expression.168
A. Transformative Use as Fair Use
Under the first factor of fair use—the purpose and character of the use—
courts look at whether the defendant’s follow-on work transformed the original.169 Where a defendant’s follow-on work transforms the original by
“add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message,” the defendant’s use
is often considered fair.170 For instance, in Blanch v. Koons, artist Jeff Koons
created his Easyfun-Ethereal series of paintings by culling images from advertisements, scanning them, and digitally superimposing the advertising “images against backgrounds of pastoral landscapes.”171 He then copied the resulting collages with paint on billboard-sized, ten feet by fourteen feet
canvasses.172 One such image, Niagara, consisted of four pairs of women’s
legs and feet hanging from the top of the work; two pairs of feet were bare
and the other two were wearing slip-on heeled sandals.173 The legs were superimposed over a pastoral image highlighted with pastries, including a plate
of donuts, a tray of Danish pastries, and a large chocolate fudge brownie
topped with ice cream.174 Koons testified that, through Niagara,
[H]e intended to “comment on the ways in which some of our most
basic appetites—for food, play, and sex—are mediated by popular
images. By re-contextualizing these fragments as I do, I try to compel
the viewer to break out of the conventional way of experiencing a
particular appetite as mediated by mass media.”175
One of the pair of legs Koons included in Niagara came from a photograph

168. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006).
169. See, e.g., Cambell, 510 U.S. at 578–94.
170. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 740 (2011) (“[R]ecent decisions that unequivocally characterize the
defendant’s use as transformative almost universally find fair use.”). See generally Clark D. Asay, Is
Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
171. 467 F.3d at 247.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 247, 261.
174. Id. at 247.
175. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Koons scanned from Allure magazine.176 The image Koons copied, Silk Sandals by Gucci, was a photo taken by Andrea Blanch, an accomplished professional fashion photographer, of a pair of legs resting on a man’s lap.177 Koons
made minor adjustments to the legs, and included them as the second pair of
legs from the left, forming the focal image of Niagara.178 Koons did not seek
permission from Blanch; Blanch sued Koons for copyright infringement, and
Koons raised the defense of fair use.179 In its analysis of the first fair use
factor, the purpose and character of Koons’s use, the court found Koons’s use
of Blanch’s photograph to be transformative because of “[t]he sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating, ‘Silk Sandals’”;180 because Koons’s use of Blanch’s photograph was the “‘raw material’ . . . in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative
objectives”;181 and because Koons’s work “adds something new, with a further purpose of different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message.”182 The court ultimately found Koons’s use to be fair.183
In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, the photographer
Thomas Forsythe developed a series of photographs entitled Food Chain Barbie, which depicted nude Barbie dolls endangered by everyday kitchen appliances, such as a malt machine, a fondue pot, and a casserole dish in a lit
oven.184 Forsythe described his work as “an attempt to ‘critique . . . the objectification of women associated with [Barbie], and . . . [to] lambast . . . the
conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects
because this is what Barbie embodies.’”185 Mattel sued Forsythe for infringing its copyright in Barbie.186 The court found Forsythe’s photographs to be
parodies that “transform Barbie’s meaning” from “the ideal American
woman” and “symbol of American girlhood” that Mattel had established, to a
message about “Barbie’s [harmful] influence on gender roles and the position

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
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Id. at 247–48.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Id. at 248–49.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 259.
353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. (alterations in original).
Id. at 797.
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of women in society.”187 The court found Forsythe’s use to be fair.188
Similarly, in Cariou v. Prince, famous appropriation artist Richard Prince
took several photographs from Patrick Cariou’s portrait and landscape photography book, Yes Rasta, altered those photos and incorporated them into
Prince’s series of works titled Canal Zone.189 Cariou sued Prince for copyright infringement of Cariou’s Yes Rasta photographs.190 The court found
twenty-five of Prince’s works to be transformative because they “manifest an
entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs. Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs depict
the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s
crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.”191
Therefore, according to the court, Prince’s follow-on works in Canal Zone
exhibit “a different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new expression,
and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct
from Cariou’s.”192 “Prince . . . ‘add[ed] something new’ and presented images with a fundamentally different aesthetic.”193 The court found Prince’s
twenty-five transformative works to be fair use of Cariou’s photographs.194
Even as fair use decisions in copyright infringement cases have increased
over the past decades, which has provided follow-on creators with greater
clarity and predictability in determining fair use,195 the applicability of fair use
in moral rights cases has largely been overlooked. The lack of case law interpreting how courts might balance an author’s moral right of integrity with the
public’s rights to expression is particularly troubling in light of the ongoing
pressure to expand moral rights in the United States.196 If moral rights are to
be expanded, most interest- or industry-groups and commentators agree that
those rights must be subject to fair use.197 However, without any guidance
187. Id. at 802.
188. Id. at 816.
189. 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 706.
192. Id. at 708.
193. Id. (alteration in original).
194. Id. at 712.
195. See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO STATE L.J. 47, 48–49 (2012); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540–42 (2009).
196. See supra Section II.B.
197. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 195, at 50 (“Almost no one doubts that the fair use doctrine is, or
should be, very important . . . .”).
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from courts and, as discussed below, with commentators and legislative history doubting the compatibility of fair use with the right of integrity, how can
the United States expand moral rights with the assumption that fair use would
provide the proper balance between authors’ rights and the public’s rights?198
B. Fair Use and Its (In)Compatibility with the Right of Integrity
At first glance, the moral right of integrity that VARA grants to authors
seems incompatible with fair use. If the right of integrity is the right to “safeguard the author’s meaning and message” in an author’s work, then any use
of the author’s work to parodize, satirize, criticize, or transform would necessarily alter the author’s meaning and message in the work and harm the author’s honor and reputation.199 But, it is precisely the alteration of the meaning
or message of an author’s work that would give rise to a fair use defense.
Indeed, transforming the meaning or message of an author’s work to express
a new meaning or message is the “very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”200
As a preliminary matter, the seeming incompatibility between the moral
right of integrity and fair use is familiar in other areas of copyright law.201 A
prime example is the seeming incompatibility between fair use and an author’s
exclusive right under copyright law to create derivatives.202 Specifically, under copyright law, an author has the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works based on their copyrighted work.203 “A ‘derivative work’ is a work
based upon one or more preexisting works . . . in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted.”204 Derivative works are often created by transforming underlying works into new works, such as producing a motion picture
based on a book, or writing a sequel to a story or song.205 However, if the
transformation of an underlying work creates a derivative, but transformation
of the underlying work also weighs in favor of fair use, then at what point
198. See infra Section III.B.
199. Kwall, supra note 55, at 6–7; see also U.S. Copyrights Office, supra note 46, at 30–31 (“[T]he
moral right of integrity protects an author’s work against any “derogatory action” that is damaging to
the author’s honor or reputation.”).
200. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
201. See Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C. L REV. 1873, 1881 (2018).
202. Id.
203. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
204. Id. § 101.
205. Id.
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does the transformation of an author’s original work transition from being an
infringement of a copyright owner’s exclusive right to create derivatives to a
permissible fair use of the copyright owner’s work?206
Courts and scholars have addressed this conflict between fair use and a
copyright owner’s derivative rights. For instance, in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., the court explicitly addressed the
“potential source of confusion in our copyright jurisprudence over the use of
the term ‘transformative.’”207 After noting that the definition of a derivative
work included any form which a work may be transformed, the court noted
that “[a]lthough derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation, such works—
unlike works of fair use—take expression for purposes that are not ‘transformative.’”208 In Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., the court described
the transformative use for purposes of fair use as “complementary” copying,
and infringing derivative use as “substitutional” copying.209 The court explained:
[C]opying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the
sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying
that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails
are substitutes for pegs or screws), or for derivative works from the
copyrighted work, is not fair use.210
R. Anthony Reese analyzed the tension between transformativeness and the

206. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 201, at 1881 ( “[If [a]n unauthorized derivative work would be infringing, but an unauthorized transformative work could be a fair use[,] . . . how is transforming a
work into a derivative work different from using a work to create a transformative work under fair
use?”); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 12:34–35 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (“On principle,
the rule [of transformative use] threatens to undermine the balance that Congress struck in section
106(2)’s derivative rights provision to give copyright owners exclusive control over transformative
works to the extent that these works borrow copyrightable expression from the copyrighted work.”).
207. 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998).
208. Id.
209. 292 F.3d 512, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2002).
210. Id. at 517, 519 (citation omitted) (finding that “photographs of Beanie Babies are conceded to
be derivative works, for which there may be a separate demand that Ty may one day seek to exploit,
and so someone who without a license from Ty sold photographs of Beanie Babies would be an infringer of Ty’s sculptural copyrights”); see also R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 475–76 (2008) (discussing Ty, In. v. Publications
Int’l Ltd.).
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derivative work right and found that “courts clearly do not view the preparation of a derivative work as necessarily transformative, such that the preparation of a derivative work is necessarily more likely (given the favored status
of transformative uses) to constitute fair use.”211 Similarly, Neil Weinstock
Netanel studied appellate and district court fair use decisions between 1995
and 2010 and found the following:
[W]hat matters for determining whether a use is transformative is
whether the use is for a different purpose than that for which the copyrighted work was created. It can help if the defendant modifies or
adds news expressive form or content as well, but different expressive purpose, not new expressive content, is almost always the key.212
Matthew Sag explained how a transformative work differed from a derivative:
[T]he assessment of transformativeness is not merely a question of
the degree of difference between two works; rather, it requires a judgment of the motivation and meaning of those differences. . . . [For
instance], the novel Pride and Prejudice and Zombies, which combines Jane Austen’s original work with scenes involving zombies,
cannibalism, and ninjas, would be considered a transformative parody of the original . . . . In contrast, a more traditional sequel would
merely be an infringing derivative work.213
In spite of this conflict, courts have managed to balance authors’ derivative rights with follow-on creators’ rights to expression under fair use numerous times in the past. Therefore, if the incompatibility between an author’s
exclusive right to prepare derivatives and fair use can be resolved in an acceptable manner on a case-by-case basis by the courts, then so too can the
seeming incompatibility between the moral right of integrity and fair use, as
detailed in Part III above.214
Additionally, fair use and how it interacts with the right of integrity under
VARA presents unique issues in light of VARA’s limited protection of single

211.
212.
213.
214.
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Reese, supra note 210, at 494.
Netanel, supra note 170, at 747.
Sag, supra note 195, at 56.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
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or limited-edition works.215 The mutilation of an original work to create new
message or meaning could mean the permanent mutilation or distortion of the
work.216 Indeed, commentators have questioned the compatibility of fair use
with VARA’s moral right of integrity precisely because of this concern. For
instance, Jane Ginsburg questioned, “What is ‘fair’ about mutilating an original (or one of a limited edition)? What public policy does it advance; what
public benefit does it secure? . . . [W]hat social need is there to destroy the
original?”217 Similarly, Peter Karlen opined that fair use has a limited role in
moral rights:
A use may infringe upon an artist’s moral rights even though it falls
into a fair use exception. In part, this is because § 107, which codifies
the fair use doctrine, sets forth considerations often having little to do
with moral rights. The use or misuse of a work for purposes such as
news reporting, scholarship, criticism, review, or classroom teaching . . . should not necessarily nullify a moral rights violation.”218
Dane Ciolino argued that “federal moral rights and the fair use doctrine are
manifestly incompatible for a number of doctrinal and practical reasons.”219
According to Ciolino, these reasons include that VARA governs the relationship between artist and personal property and not “nonrivalrous uses of intangible copyrighted works,” that VARA governs personal rights that deserve
greater respect, and that the § 107 factors do not work when applied to use of
tangible property.220 One commenter pointed out that the language of § 107,
which uses the words “including such use by reproduction in copies,”221 seems
inconsistent with the fair use of a single-copy or limited-edition work.222 Ra-

215. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
216. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
217. Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary House of Rep.’s, 101st
Cong. 93 (1989) (statement of Jane Ginsburg, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University
School of Law).
218. Peter H. Karlen, What’s Wrong with VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights, 15 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 905, 912–13 (1993).
219. Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 33, 37 (1997).
220. Id.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (emphasis added).
222. Thank you to James Gibson for pointing this out.
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chel Buker described the inclusion of a fair use defense in VARA as “befuddling,” finding it “unclear just how fair use applies to moral rights.”223 Finally,
Amy Adler remarked:
I doubt a court would extend the [fair use] provisions very far in the
case of a permanent alteration of a unique work of art. The fair use
concept seems to depend on copying. The original remains intact.
Permanently defacing someone’s work to create a new one seems far
more troubling than market damages caused by unauthorized copies.224
In fact, the legislative history of VARA showed that there was some doubt
over whether and how fair use could apply to a moral rights claim:
The Committee does not want to preclude fair use claims in this context. However, it recognizes that it is unlikely that such claims will
be appropriate given the limited number of works covered by the Act,
and given that the modification of a single copy or limited edition of
a work of visual art has different implications for the fair use doctrine
than does an act involving a work reproduced in potentially unlimited
copies.225
While these concerns are certainly legitimate, and it may appear cavalier
to allow the permanent mutilation of an original work of art in the name of
free expression, the right of integrity does not only apply to instances where
an original work is permanently mutilated. In its most expansive form, the
right of integrity protects against the decontexualization of a work, such as
placing Fearless Girl in front of Charging Bull, in addition to the physical
mutilation of the work.226 Indeed, VARA explicitly protects against the distortion, modification, and mutilation of a work that prejudices an author’s

223. Rachel Buker, On Art Attacks: At the Confluence of Shock, Appropriation, and the Law, 14 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 393, 403 (2015).
224. Adler, supra note 27, at 281 n.99.
225. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6932. However, it is
worthy to note that this statement occurred three years before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which found that the more transformative the follow-on work,
the more likely the follow-on work would be considered fair use. 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994).
226. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text. But see infra note 229.

632

[Vol. 47: 601, 2020]

Creative Destruction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

honor and reputation.227 For instance, Sergio Munoz Sarmiento believes that
the right of integrity could have a more expansive application; he highlights
the fact that VARA’s wording fails to explicitly limit the definition of mutilation to physical alterations.228 And even though VARA’s public presentation exception has been interpreted to excuse decontextualization of works
from violating an author’s right of integrity,229 that exception may not excuse
all decontextualizations now or in the future. Indeed, if VARA is most concerned with protecting an author’s honor and reputation, damage to an author’s honor and reputation could occur through decontextualization, temporary and impermanent modification, and physical mutilation of their work.
Furthermore, as discussed below, the line between decontextualization excused under the public presentation exception and decontextualization not excused under the public presentation exception can be easily blurred.230 The
line between permanent mutilation and impermanent mutilation is similarly
thin.231 For instance, if spraying paint on a concrete sculpture prejudices the
sculpture’s honor and reputation, does it matter whether the paint may or may
not be removable? If—under the public presentation exception—VARA excuses a shopping mall from tying red ribbons on sculptures of geese because
the ribbons are impermanent, does it make a difference if the mall owners
never remove the red ribbons? As I explore below, some actions by followon creators that may fall under VARA’s public presentation exception might
be more appropriately analyzed under fair use.232 There are contexts where a

227. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012).
228. Isaac Kaplan, Fearless Girl Face-off Poses a New Question: Does the Law Protect an Artist’s
Message?, ARTSY (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-fearless-girl-face-offposes-new-question-law-protect-artists-message.
229. See, e.g., id. (quoting Amy Adler, “Under moral rights in this country, while you can sue for
someone actually physically changing a sculpture, changing a sculpture by placing another sculpture
near it is simply not actionable . . . . We don’t want to let artists start suing curators because they don’t
like who their work is displayed next to.”); Annemarie Bridy, Fearless Girl Meets Charging Bull:
Copyright and the Regulation of Intertextuality, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 293, 326 (2019) (stating that
the public presentation exception to VARA’s right of integrity “does not give artists the right to prevent so-called contextual modifications—defined as those that ‘leave the substance of the work intact,
but change the appearance or perception of the work by putting it into a context that differs from the
one originally intended or envisioned by the author’”).
230. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
231. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
232. See discussion infra Sections IV.A–B.
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follow-on creator can only express an important message or meaning by distorting the original or limited-edition work.233
Moreover, even though VARA explicitly makes the moral right of integrity “[s]ubject to section 107[’s]” fair use provision,234 other common law
countries that protect the moral rights of authors do not provide an explicit
defense of fair use (or fair dealing)235 to moral rights claims.236 This does not
mean, however, that fair use is incompatible with the moral right of integrity
or that courts in those countries do not consider whether the defendant’s use
is fair in moral rights litigation.237 For instance, certain countries, such as
Australia, provide a defense to defendants where the violation of moral rights
is “reasonable in all the circumstances.”238 At present, there are no cases confirming whether courts would find the distortion, mutilation, or modification
of a work for purpose of parody, satire, or criticism to be “reasonable in all
the circumstances.”239 Furthermore, in Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, mentioned
above, the Belgium Court of Appeals considered whether the follow-on work
in that case would be excused under the parody exception under Belgian
law.240 In light of this important question, the court sent the question to the
European Court of Justice to consider whether parody is a defense under European Union law, and if so, what constitutes a parody.241 This seems to signal
a willingness to consider parody as a defense to moral rights.
Finally, in spite of the explicit reference to fair use as a defense to VARA

233. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012).
235. See, e.g., supra note 44. Common law nations such as Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom,
and New Zealand apply the defense of fair dealing to copyright claims. See id. Fair dealing has been
described as a narrower defense that is only applicable to a set of enumerated purposes, such as parody
or satire. Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309, 318 (2008). The
U.S. applies the defense of fair use to copyright claims, which is more flexible and can apply to any
purpose. Id. But see Ariel Katz, Debunking the Fair Use vs. Fair Dealing Myth: Have We Had Fair
Use All Along, LAWARXIV PAPERS (July 2, 2018), https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/26vjt.
236. See Sainsbury, supra note 16, at 149.
237. E.g., Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt IX div 6 s 195AS (Austl.); see also D’Agostino, supra note
235, at 338–39 (describing U.K. copyright law as involving a three-step test a defendant must overcome in copyright litigation).
238. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt IX div 6 s 195AS.
239. Id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83.
241. See supra note 83.
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claims, no court in the United Sates has found a fair use defense in this context.242 This lack of case law, however, could be attributable to multiple reasons other than its incompatibility. First, VARA has only been enforceable
since 1990 and covers a limited subject matter: works of visual art.243 This
means that there is still relatively little litigation over VARA claims244 and
much fewer court decisions on VARA claims compared to copyright infringement claims.245 Additionally, while some defendants in VARA claims have
asserted fair use as an affirmative defense to right of integrity claims, courts
often dispose of VARA claims on other grounds, such as the public presentation exception,246 or they interpret VARA to exclude protection of certain
works.247 For instance, in Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Büchel, Büchel claimed, among other things, that the museum’s
covering of his unfinished work and allowing visitors to see his work displayed covered with a tarp violated his right of integrity.248 In response to
Büchel’s claim, MASS MoCA asserted a number of affirmative defenses—
one of which was fair use.249 In that case, however, the court disposed of
Büchel’s claim under the public presentation exception, stating that “the mere
covering of the artwork by the Museum, its host, cannot reasonably be deemed
an intentional act of distortion or modification of Büchel’s creation.”250 Because of this ruling, the court never analyzed the merits of the parties’ dispute;
nor did the court analyze the museum’s actions under the factors of fair use.251

242. See supra Section II.B.
243. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
244. See Bonneau, supra note 46, at 100 n.257 (“[C]ase law of this nature is undeveloped.”).
245. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An Empirical Study
of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 1997–98 (2014) (comparing copyright infringement
claims under 17 U.S.C. § 106 to other copyright actions, including VARA claims, and finding claims
for unauthorized reproduction of work under § 106(1) were the most common while claims under
VARA were the most rare).
246. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 46–47 (1st Cir.
2010).
247. See, e.g., Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 595 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding a mobile replica of a
sixteenth-century Spanish galleon, created from an old school bus, to be applied art excluded from the
definition of visual art under VARA); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 142–43
(1st Cir. 2006) (holding that VARA does not protect site-specific art).
248. Büchel, 459 F.3d at 42.
249. Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Counterclaims Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found.,
Inc. v. Büchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D. Mass. July 12, 2017) (No. 3:07-cv-30089).
250. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 61.
251. Id. at 65.
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Furthermore, where it relates specifically to follow-on creators modifying
an original artist’s work for the sake of expression, another reason there are
no published decisions on fair use in right of integrity claims might be because
social norms resolve many of those disputes.252 For instance, in 2009, street
artist Banksy mutilated a 1985 work by street artist King Robbo on the Regents Canal in London.253 Banksy mutilated Robbo’s work by painting an
image of a workman wall-papering over Robbo’s artwork.254 In response,
Robbo changed the image of Banksy’s work to look like the workman was
painting the tag “King Robbo.”255 Banksy changed the image again, and
Robbo responded by painting over the work with a cartoon character leaning
against a tombstone that said “R.I.P. Banksy’s Career.”256 Famous feuds between street artists, such as the feud between Banksy and Robbo, are examples
of artists relying on social norms instead of moral rights litigation to resolve
their disputes.257 Some artists even welcome other artists’ use of their works
for the sake of encouraging and creating expression.258 For instance, in 1953,
Robert Rauschenberg took an original Willem de Kooning work of art and
erased it.259 This resulted in “a sheet of paper bearing the faint, ghostly
shadow of its former markings,” which Rauschenberg titled Erased de Kooning Drawing and exhibited.260 While this action, if it occurred today and de
Kooning were alive, would certainly violate de Kooning’s moral right of integrity, de Kooning—in fact—gifted Rauschenberg the work to erase.261
When de Kooning finally understood and relented to Rauschenberg’s artistic
intent, de Kooning did not just gift Rauschenberg any work, he specifically
252. See infra text accompanying notes 253–62.
253. Cathay Y. N. Smith, Street Art: An Analysis Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law and Intellectual Property’s “Negative Space” Theory, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 279
(2014).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 279–80.
256. Id. at 280. See also The Banksy vs Robbo War in Pictures, TWISTED SIFTER (Jan. 12, 2012),
https://twistedsifter.com/2012/01/banksy-vs-robbo-war-in-pictures/.
257. See Smith, supra note 253, at 279 (“The ultimate offense in street art is writing over someone
else’s work. When this rule is not observed, street artists often take to the streets to punish each other
for failure to follow normative street art rules, resulting in street art ‘feuds.’”).
258. Robert Rauschenberg, Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953, SFMOMA, https://www.sfmoma.
org/artwork/98.298/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
259. Id.
260. Adler, supra note 27, at 283.
261. Abigail Cain, Why Robert Rauschenberg Erased a De Kooning, ARTSY (July 14, 2017, 2:47
PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-robert-rauschenberg-erased-de-kooning.
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went through his portfolio to find “something [he would] miss.”262
In spite of its seeming incompatibility, the lack of any case law or international equivalents, this Paper argues that fair use can and should be used to
limit authors’ integrity claims in the United States.263 This determination can
be made by creatively analyzing and balancing the four factors under § 107,
similar to the analysis of fair use in copyright infringement claims.264 In light
of the ongoing pressure to expand moral rights in the U.S., it is important to
understand how fair use can and should balance the interests of authors’ rights
to the integrity in their works with the interests of the public in having access
to new expression.265
IV. FAIR USE AND THE DISTORTION, MUTILATION,
OR OTHER MODIFICATION OF WORKS
The moral right of integrity gives authors the right “to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”266 This Part analyzes three
different contexts that could violate an author’s right of integrity. The first
involves instances where the follow-on creator distorts, mutilates, or modifies
the meaning of an author’s work without physically altering the work, such as
where the placement of a piece of art interacts with, decontextualizes, or
clearly comments upon an author’s original work.267 This decontextualization
could be temporary or permanent.268 The second context is where a followon creator distorts, mutilates, or modifies an artist’s work by physically—but
temporarily or impermanently—altering the work,269 such as placing ribbons
on a sculpture270 or partially covering a piece of art with tarp or curtains.271
The final context involves a follow-on creator who permanently distorts, mutilates, or modifies a physical copy of an artist’s work in order to make an
262. Id.
263. See discussion infra Part IV.
264. See discussion infra Part IV.
265. See Samuelson, supra note 195, at 2540 for a description of the strength of the fair use doctrine
as balancing interests of copyright owners with interests of subsequent authors and the public.
266. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012).
267. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
268. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
269. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
270. See infra notes 343–46 and accompanying text.
271. See infra notes 333–40 and accompanying text.
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artistic, social, or political statement, such as erasing a painting, drawing
clown faces on serious portraits, or spray-painting derogatory language on a
sculpture.272 This permanent distortion could be of a single-copy work or a
limited-edition work.273 This Part examines how copyright’s fair use doctrine
can flexibly serve as a limitation to integrity rights under those three contexts
and interprets how the four fair use factors in § 107 may be used to balance
the author’s right of integrity with the public’s rights to find fair use where a
follow-on creator modifies, distorts, or mutilates an author’s work to transform the work and give the work new meaning.
A. Decontextualization
The first context that could violate the moral right of integrity, under an
expansive view of moral rights, involves the distortion, mutilation, or modification of the context or meaning of an author’s work. In this category, the
follow-on creator does nothing to physically alter the author’s work, but
through some permanent or temporary action, distorts, modifies, or mutilates
the context or original meaning of the author’s work, thereby prejudicing the
artist’s honor and reputation.274 A recent example of this scenario involved
the dispute between artist Arturo Di Modica, creator of the Charging Bull
sculpture on Wall Street, and Kristen Visbal’s Fearless Girl sculpture.275
On December 16, 1989, New York financial operators arrived at the New
York Stock Exchange to find a 7,700 pound, eleven foot tall, sixteen foot long
bronze sculpture of a charging bull installed across the street.276 Di Modica
had installed the Charging Bull street art guerilla-style, under cover of
night.277 The Charging Bull represented “optimism and strength amid adversity” at a time when the U.S. stock market was experiencing a crash.278 In
response to its immediate popularity, instead of removing or destroying
272. See infra Section IV.C.
273. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
274. See, e.g., supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
275. Tom McCarthy, Fearless Girl v Charging Bull: New York’s Biggest Public Art Controversy in
Years, GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/14/fearless-girlstatue-women-new-york-bull.
276. Tiziano Thomas Dossena, A New York Story: How the Charging Bull “Chose” Wall Street,
BRIDGE PUGLIA USA (Feb. 2018), http://www.bridgepugliausa.it/articolo.asp?id_sez=2&id_cat=37
&id_art=3483&lingua=en.
277. McCarthy, supra note 275.
278. Id.
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Charging Bull, the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation temporarily installed it on the cobblestone-paved square of Bowling Green where
it remains today.279 On March 7, 2017,280 almost twenty-eight years later,
State Street Global Advisors installed artist Kristen Visbal’s sculpture, Fearless Girl, twenty feet away from Charging Bull.281 The Fearless Girl weighed
250 pounds and stood about four feet tall; she stood defiant and straight, hands
on her hips, feet planted on the ground, her ponytail and skirt seemed to billow
in the wind.282 She faced Charging Bull head on.283 Fearless Girl intended to
send a message about gender diversity and equality and to “[k]now the power
of women in leadership” at a time when the media was heightening its focus
and scrutiny on gender inequality on Wall Street.284 Di Modica claimed that
Fearless Girl “was an insult to his work,” and that “[s]he’s there attacking the
bull.”285 The placement of Fearless Girl—standing defiantly and facing
Charging Bull head-on—certainly “subverted the bull’s meaning,” which was
to promote “freedom in the world, peace, strength, power[,] and love.”286 Indeed, even though Fearless Girl did not physically alter Di Modica’s work, it
clearly interacted with it, and certainly reinterpreted Charging Bull’s original
positive and uplifting message showing “the strength and power of the American people”287 by casting a menacing light onto the sculpture and transforming it “into a negative force and a threat” connoting antifeminism and disempowerment of women.288
Under the current interpretation of VARA, the installation of Fearless
Girl and her deliberate interaction with Charging Bull is not likely to support
a cause of action for violating Di Modica’s right of integrity.289 In the United
279. Dossena, supra note 276.
280. Lisa Marie Segarra, The Fearless Girl Statue Won’t Be Staring Down The Charging Bull Anymore. But She’ll Be Close By, TIME (Apr. 19, 2018), https://time.com/5191243/fearless-girl-statuelocation-moving/.
281. Lawrence Arboleda, ‘Fearless Girl’ Stands Defiant To Wall Street’s Charging Bull For
Women’s Day, INQUISITR (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.inquisitr.com/4042690/sculpture-fearless-girlnow-stands-in-defiance-to-wall-street-charging-bull/.
282. See Garcia, supra note 1.
283. See Arboleda, supra note 281.
284. See Garcia, supra note 1.
285. Barron, supra note 11.
286. Id.
287. Dossena, supra note 276.
288. Barron, supra note 11.
289. Bridy, supra note 229, at 327; Emma Barraclough, Raging Bull and Fearless Girl – Moral
Rights in Copyright, WIPO MAGAZINE (Apr. 2018), https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/
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States, the public presentation exception in VARA exempts from a right of
integrity violation “[t]he modification of a work of visual art which is the result . . . of the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the
work.”290 Specifically, modification because of public presentation “is not a
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . unless the modification is caused by gross negligence.”291 Not all scholars agree that the public presentation exception will exempt non-physical alterations of a work; as
Sergio Munoz Sarmiento points out, the statute’s wording does not explicitly
limit the definition of mutilation to physical alterations.292 However, based
on past case law and legislative history, the mere presentation of another’s
work next to the author’s work may be exempt from VARA under its public
presentation exception.293 This exception, for instance, allows museums to
exercise their curatorial discretion to place works next to each other—to allow
the works to interact with each other—in order to exhibit a specific message
or meaning, even if that message could harm an artist’s honor or reputation.294
This exception also permitted a property developer to erect a building to completely obstruct a mural in English v. BFC & R East 11th Street LLC.295 Indeed, Annemarie Bridy explores the dispute between Charging Bull and Fearless Girl and finds Di Modica’s claim under VARA to be “bull.”296 “To the
extent that Fearless Girl’s presence in Bowling Green Park modifies the meaning of Charging Bull for either DiModica himself or members of the public,
that modification in no way violates DiModica’s right of integrity under
VARA” given VARA’s focus on physical alterations and given VARA’s public presentation exception.297 Amy Adler further explained, “We don’t want
to let artists start suing curators because they don’t like who their work is
displayed next to.”298 More importantly, “A policy that would allow one artist

2018/02/article_0003.html (“[T]here is general agreement that VARA would not protect the Charging
Bull sculpture from having its Fearless Girl rival placed nearby.”).
290. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2012).
291. Id.
292. See Kaplan, supra note 228.
293. See supra notes 246–51 and accompanying text.
294. See id.
295. English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 3, 1997).
296. Bridy, supra note 229, at 327.
297. Id.
298. See Kaplan, supra note 228 (quoting Amy Adler).
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to stop another artist’s work would be a mistake[;] . . . [a]ll public art is ideally in dialogue with the space it exists in. And that includes other sculptures.”299
That being said, as discussed above, under a more expansive interpretation of the moral right of integrity, decontextualization of an author’s work
that causes prejudice to that author’s honor and reputation could be considered
a distortion, modification, or mutilation of the author’s work and could support a cause of action for violating the author’s right of integrity.300 For instance, in the Stockholm District Court decision mentioned above, the court
found an author’s right of integrity to be violated where his work was exhibited next to highly pornographic photos.301 If the United States were to expand
the scope of VARA to mirror countries that hold this more expansive view of
moral rights, this type of decontextualization of works could give rise to a
right of integrity claim.302
Additionally, there could be instances where it is difficult to draw the line
between decontextualization due to public presentation and decontextualization due to other actionable modifications of works.303 As Merryman explains:
It seems undeniable that an exhibition can be stacked, whether deliberately or not, so as to misrepresent the artist’s work. This could adversely affect the artist’s reputation and thus arguably impair his
moral right. But to ask a court to intervene is to suggest something
close to, if not indistinguishable from, censorship. Just as one would
be reluctant to suggest judicial suppressing or “editing” of a book
that, in the selection of paintings illustrated and in the text, misrepresented a painter’s work, so one ought to avoid similar suppression or
“editing” of an exhibition. Yet if one agrees with this argument, how
is it possible to support a right of integrity at all? Is there a convenient
line to be drawn between the kinds of mistreatment of the artist’s
work that ought to be legally prevented and other kinds for which, in
299. Id. (quoting Amy Adler).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 226–27.
301. Brown-Pedersen, supra note 76, at 127.
302. See Birdy, supra note 229, at 333 (highlighting that U.S. copyright law is geared toward promoting commerce, whereas other international systems have more expansive views on protecting an
artist’s power over their work).
303. See Merryman, supra note 18, at 1033–34.
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order to protect freedom of expression or other overriding social interests, no such legal remedy is available? The instinctive response
is that there is such a line, at least in the sense that most cases fall
clearly into one or the other category, but experience leads us to expect that there will be difficult cases, just as there are difficult cases
wherever legal lines must be drawn.304
Take the Charging Bull and Fearless Girl dispute as an example.305 What
if the Fearless Girl was not placed twenty feet away from the Charging Bull;
imagine if Fearless Girl was, instead, placed a mere one foot away from the
Charging Bull, allowing the Charging Bull to tower over the Girl? Or, imagine if Fearless Girl was a mere one foot away from Charging Bull, raising
one hand high in front of her that physically touches the Bull’s nose to seemingly hold back or halt the Bull’s forward charge. Or, imagine if Visbal had
created Fearless Girl to fit atop Charging Bull, so that she appears to be riding
and taming the Bull. All of these scenarios would distort and modify Charging Bull, change the message of Charging Bull, and prejudice Di Modica’s
honor or reputation—but would all of these scenarios be excused under
VARA’s public presentation exception? Do we draw the line at “physical”
interaction? In other words, as long as Fearless Girl sculpture does not physically interact with the Charging Bull, is it excused under public presentation?
So, the scenario of Fearless Girl riding Charging Bull would not be excused
under the public presentation exception, but placing the Girl one foot away
from the Bull, allowing the Bull to seemingly tower over the Girl but not make
any physical contact, would be excused.306 However, if we draw the line at
physical interaction, does that mean that the scenario of the Girl touching the
Bull’s nose would also not be excused under the public presentation exception
merely because her hand physically interacts with the Bull? What if her hand
is a mere one inch away from the Bull, making it appear like she is touching
him when, upon closer inspection, there is a one inch gap? Drawing the line
at physical interaction can seem arbitrary, especially if the purpose of the right
of integrity is to safeguard an author’s honor and reputation. An author’s
honor and reputation can be prejudiced in all of the actions above, even where
the interaction with another piece of art is not physical.
What seems clearer, however, is that all of the scenarios imagined above
304. Id.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 276–88.
306. Id.
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could support a defense of fair use. Fair use guarantees breathing space within
the confines of copyright307 and, as VARA explicitly states, also provides
breathing space within the confines of moral rights.308 As Annemarie Bridy
explained: “Without fair use, ‘unfaithful continuations’ and other antagonistic
intertexts would be subject to veto by authors whose aesthetics skew monologic.”309 The four factors, illustrated in § 107, to determine whether fair use
excuses a follow-on creator’s work are,
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.310
Under all of the Charging Bull versus Fearless Girl scenarios discussed
above, the first factor—purpose and character of the use—would weigh in
favor of fair use. In all of the scenarios above, Fearless Girl’s interaction and
reinterpretation or recontextualization of the Charging Bull alters the meaning
and message of the Bull.311 They change the Bull’s message from one of optimism on Wall Street to a message criticizing the gender gap on Wall Street
and proclaiming the strength of women.312 Like Randall’s book The Wind
Done Gone, which transformed the message and meaning in Mitchell’s Gone
With the Wind in Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin,313 so too does Fearless Girl
transform the message and meaning in Charging Bull.314 Indeed, altering the
meaning of an original work, transforming the meaning or message of that
work so it expresses a new meaning or message, is the “very type of activity

307. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
308. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
309. Bridy, supra note 229, at 317.
310. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
311. See Bridy, supra note 229, at 332 (highlighting that Fearless Girl’s placement next to Charging
Bull was both “critical and transformative,” and explaining that, from a fair use point of view, “Fearless Girl was created to symbolically contest the culture of masculine corporate power that Charging
Bull can be read to represent”).
312. See Kaplan, supra note 228.
313. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2001).
314. See Kaplan, supra note 228.
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that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”315
The second factor of fair use looks at the nature of the copyrighted work,
specifically examining “whether the work is expressive or creative . . . or
more factual, with a greater leeway being allowed to a claim of fair use where
the work is factual or informational.”316 Courts in the past have acknowledged
that sculptural works, such as Di Modica’s Charging Bull, are expressive and
creative in nature.317 However, the creative nature of an author’s work is given
limited weight in fair use analysis where the follow-on work uses “the original
‘in a transformative manner to comment on [a work’s] social and aesthetic
meaning rather than to exploit its creative virtues.’”318 Because Fearless Girl
comments on Di Modica’s “social and aesthetic meaning” rather than “exploit
its creative virtues,” the creative and expressive nature of Charging Bull
would be given limited weight.319
Similarly, the third factor—amount and substantiality used—would also
be given less weight because of Fearless Girl’s use of Charging Bull to express a new message and meaning.320 Indeed, in order to express the message
for female equality on Wall Street, it was necessary to use the entire Charging
Bull sculpture to get that message across.321
Finally, the fourth factor of fair use is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the . . . work,” which examines “whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in . . . would result in a
substantially adverse impact on the potential market.”322 Here, it is possible

315. Leval, supra note 200, at 1111 (1990). While Fearless Girl was created by an artist and highlights the gender gap in Wall Street, it may also be considered an advertisement expressing pure commercial speech. See Kaplan, supra note 228. Specifically, the work promotes SSGA’s exchangetraded fund, SHE. Id. As Di Modica’s attorney pointed out: “If an artist had put the girl there just for
its message, it would be a different situation. But those aren’t the facts.” Id. This Paper puts that
commercial argument aside to focus specifically on the transformative message and meaning of Fearless Girl.
316. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
317. See, e.g., id.
318. Id. (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006)).
319. See id.
320. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more transformative
the new work, the less will be the significance of the other factors . . . that may weigh against a finding
of fair use.”).
321. See Bridy, supra note 229, at 305 (“Charging Bull is a ‘necessary element’ to State Street’s
politically engaged art project . . . . [w]ithout Charging Bull as an interlocuter, Fearless Girl is just a
statue of a little girl standing with her chin in the air and her hands on her hips.”).
322. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1375.
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that the appreciation or even the market for Di Modica’s Charging Bull may
decrease due to Fearless Girl’s negative message.323 This type of market
harm, however, “like a scathing theater review” may “kill[] demand for the
original,” but is not the type of market harm considered under fair use.324 Indeed, even though Fearless Girl may disparage Charging Bull or Di Modica,
such “[b]iting criticism that [merely suppresses] demand” is not “a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”325
While decontextualization of an author’s work may not be a violation of
the author’s right of integrity under VARA in light of its public presentation
exception, this may not always be the case if we expand moral rights.326 Additionally, the line between what is excused activity under the public presentation exception and what is not excused activity under the exception can also
be a bit arbitrary.327 In situations where the public presentation exception may
not clearly apply and a follow-on creator decontextualizes an author’s work
by distorting, mutilating, or modifying it to give the work new meaning or
message, courts, litigants, and authors should consider whether the fair use
doctrine may limit the follow-on creator’s liability under the moral right of
integrity.
B. Temporary or Impermanent Distortion, Mutilation, or Modification
The second context that may violate the moral right of integrity, under an
expansive view of moral rights, involves the temporary or impermanent physical distortion, mutilation, or modification of an author’s work. Unlike the
first category, where the defendant does not physically alter the artist’s work,
this category involves the defendant physically—but temporarily—distorting,
mutilating, or modifying the artist’s work.328 Even though the distortion may

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See Bridy, supra note 229, at 305.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92.
Id. at 592 (alterations in original) (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)).
See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
See discussion in supra Section IV.A.
See, e.g., Eastwood, supra note 84.
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be temporary, the damage to the artist’s honor and reputation may be permanent.329 This circumstance was presented in MASS MoCA v. Büchel330 and
Snow v. Eaton Centre Ltd.331 Neither alteration was permanent, but both artists claimed that their honor and reputation were damaged.332
In MASS MoCA v. Büchel, the artist Büchel asserted a claim under VARA
for violation of his right of integrity against MASS MoCA when MASS
MoCA displayed the artist’s incomplete sculptural work covered with a
tarp.333 The artist and MASS MoCA entered into an agreement to create and
display Büchel’s sculptural work, Training Ground for Democracy.334 MASS
MoCA funded the art, it went over budget, and the artist refused to continue
the work because of artistic differences.335 Instead of destroying the work,
MASS MoCA covered it with a tarp and invited audiences to walk past the
covered work to attend its Made at MASS MoCA exhibit, which was an exhibit
focusing on the collaboration between artists and museums.336 The court in
MASS MoCA held that displaying Büchel’s unfinished work covered under a
tarp was not an intentional act of distortion or modification of Büchel’s creation.337 The court admitted that MASS MoCA was not “necessarily acting
with pure intentions when it created ‘Made at MASS MoCA’ in close proximity to the tarped ‘Training Ground.’”338 Indeed, the court surmised that the
museum was likely using the covered art to criticize Büchel and to communicate its anger at the artist by “juxtaposing his unfinished work with the successful artistic collaborations depicted in its new exhibition.”339 The court
interpreted MASS MoCA’s act to be “intended to highlight, rather than hide,
the failed collaboration.”340 However, the court found the museum’s action

329. See id. (explaining that three art experts testified that the owner decorating Snow’s geese with
Christmas ribbons “ma[de] a mockery of [the work’s] intended purpose by distorting its appearance,
transforming it into a ‘kitschy’ sentimental display, resembling a Christmas bauble,” which prejudiced
“Snow’s artistic honour and reputation”).
330. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 45.
331. Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.).
332. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 46; see Eastwood, supra note 84.
333. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 46.
334. Id. at 43.
335. Id. at 44–45.
336. Id. at 45.
337. Id. at 61.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 62.
340. Id.
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not to violate the right of integrity, because the right does not protect the artist
“from disparaging commentary about his behavior.”341 It only protects from
the “intentional act of distortion or modification” of the artist’s work.342
In the Canadian case Snow v. Eaton Centre, the artist of Flight Stop—a
sculpture consisting of sixty flying/hanging geese—sued the owner of the
work for displaying the work with red holiday ribbons around the geese’s
necks.343 The artist, Michael Snow, felt that the addition of the ribbons “jarred
the harmony of his naturalistic composition, altered its basic character and
purpose, and ultimately affected his artistic reputation.”344 He sued Eaton
Centre, and the court ordered the Centre to remove the red ribbons.345 In addition to the artist’s own statement that the ribbons prejudiced his honor and
reputation, the court relied on the artist’s experts that testified to the harm to
Snow’s reputation, including that the red ribbons made “a mockery of its intended purposes” and transformed the work “into a ‘kitschy’ sentimental display, resembling a Christmas bauble.”346
In the U.S., however, Eaton Centre’s actions might be excused under the
public presentation exception.347 Specifically, the House Report on the hearings on VARA stated:
Under subsection (c)(2), galleries and museums continue to have normal discretion to light, frame, and place works of art. However, conduct that goes beyond presentation of a work to physical modification
of it is actionable. For example, Representative Markey described
the actions of two Australian entrepreneurs who cut Picasso’s “Trois
Femmes” into hundreds of pieces and sold them as “original Picasso
pieces.” This is clearly not a presentation question. On the other
hand, the Committee believes that the presentation exclusion would
operate to protect a Canadian shopping center that temporarily bedecked a sculpture of geese in flight with ribbons at Christmas

341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.); Eastwood,
supra note 84.
344. See Eastwood, supra note 84.
345. Snow, 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105; see Eastwood, supra note 84.
346. See Eastwood, supra note 84.
347. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2012).
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time.348
Based on the court’s decision in MASS MoCA349 and the House Report’s
statement on the facts in Snow,350 it seems that the temporary distortion, modification, or mutilation of art—such as partially covering it with a tarp or tying
red ribbons on it—would not violate the right to integrity under VARA.351
However, VARA does not use the words permanent or temporary or draw a
line between those differences in the statute.352 Indeed, it is interesting to
consider why the temporary or impermanent distortion of a piece of work
would be excused from VARA even though it may cause permanent damage
to an artist’s honor and reputation. For instance, would the same exact activities—placing a tarp over the work or tying ribbons on art pieces—violate
VARA had they been semi-permanent? What if MASS MoCA decided to
exhibit Büchel’s work covered with a tarp for many years or as a permanent
exhibition? What if the mall in Eaton Centre decided to never take the red
ribbons off of Snow’s geese sculptures? VARA does not use the words permanent or temporary in the statute, and it seems arbitrary for a violation of the
right of integrity to rest upon whether the mutilation was permanent or impermanent. Indeed, how long must a mutilation occur for it to be permanent and,
therefore, actionable? What types of distortions are, in fact, permanent? Is
Agata Oleksiak’s yarn bombing of Charging Bull in a pink and purple cozy
knit permanent?353 Could an artist not succeed under a VARA claim against
a third party who sprays paint on a concrete sculpture because there are now
chemicals that can effectively remove spray paint from concrete? Instead of
drawing an arbitrary line between permanent and impermanent mutilation of
works, perhaps these activities could be appropriately examined under fair
use.
For instance, in MASS MoCA v. Büchel, the Museum’s covering and exhibiting of Büchel’s unfinished sculpture in a Made at MASS MoCA exhibit
could be considered fair use.354 As a preliminary matter, covering the work
348. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921 (footnotes omitted).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 333–42.
350. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514.
351. See discussion supra notes 332–50; 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
352. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
353. See Malia Wollan, Graffiti’s Cozy, Feminine Side, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/fashion/creating-graffiti-with-yarn.html.
354. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 45–46 (1st Cir.
2010).
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and exhibiting it in an exhibition focusing on the Museum’s successful and
failed collaboration with artists seems to transform the meaning of the work
to create a new message.355 According to the Museum’s website:
Made at MASS MoCA [was] a documentary project exploring the
issues raised in the course of complex collaborative projects between
artists and institutions. The exhibition examines some of the many
ways in which MASS MoCA has worked with a wide range of visual
and performing artists over more than a decade. In addition to serving as a presenter—the conventional role of museums—MASS
MoCA is also a fabricator of large-scale works, a host of extended
artist residencies, and a collaborator and co-producer. The exhibition
looks at the implications of those roles and relationships and how
they are relevant to the making and distribution of art today.
Made at MASS MoCA gives visitors insight into how major works
of art take shape and what it means to describe MASS MoCA as an
open platform for research and development in the arts.356
The court in MASS MoCA acknowledged:
MASS MoCA was not necessarily acting with pure intentions when
it created “Made at MASS MoCA” in close proximity to the tarped
“Training Ground.” It might be a fair inference that the Museum was
deliberately communicating its anger with Büchel by juxtaposing his
unfinished work with the successful artistic collaborations depicted
in its new exhibition.357
Assume that the MASS MoCA exhibit was intended to exhibit both successful
and failed collaborations with artists by partially covering Büchel’s work with
a tarp and juxtaposing his unfinished work with the MASS MoCA’s other
successful collaborations;358 MASS MoCA has certainly transformed

355. Id.
356. Made at MASS MoCA, MASS MOCA, https://massmoca.org/event/made-mass-moca/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
357. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 61–62.
358. See id. at 62.
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Büchel’s work to express a new purpose, message, and meaning. As a nonprofit museum359 whose mission is to educate the public,360 the Museum’s use
of Büchel’s work would further be considered to be of a noncommercial nature.361 Under the second factor of fair use, while Büchel’s work is highly
expressive and creative, we know that this does not necessarily tilt the fair use
analysis where the follow-on creator uses the work in a transformative manner
to comment on the social and aesthetic meaning of the work.362
The third factor of fair use, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used, might also weigh in favor of fair use.363 While Büchel’s entire work was
partially covered under the tarp during the exhibition, portions of his work
were actually viewable, creating “a conceptual peep show.”364 Furthermore,
where the follow-on creator uses the original work in order to comment upon
the work, courts recognize that the follow-on creator needs to use enough of
the original in order to get their message across.365 Finally, the fourth factor,
market harm, is debatable.366 Exhibiting Büchel’s work covered under a tarp
might cause harm to the future market of Büchel’s works, either due to the
disparaging commentary about Büchel’s behavior or due to viewers gaining
“an inaccurate sense of his art” and judging “his work on the basis of this
experience.”367 The former harm resulting from disparaging commentary
about Büchel’s behavior is not harm that is nor should be considered under
fair use.368 Indeed, museums should be able to use an artist’s work to criticize
the artist’s behavior just as they can use words to criticize the artist; if this
causes museums to be wary of partnering with Büchel in the future, that harm

359. FAQs, MASS MOCA, https://massmoca.org/visit/faq-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2019).
360. Education, MASS MOCA, https://massmoca.org/education/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019).
361. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
362. See supra notes 316–19 and accompanying text.
363. Measuring Fair Use: The Four Factors, STAN. UNIV. LIBRARIES, https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (“The less you take, the more likely
that your copying will be excused as fair use.”).
364. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 2010).
365. See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The general
standard . . . is clear enough: the fair use copier must copy no more than is reasonably necessary [not
strictly necessary—room must be allowed for judgment, and judges must not police criticism with a
heavy hand] to enable him to pursue an aim that the law recognizes as proper . . . .”).
366. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
367. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 60.
368. See id. at 62.
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to Büchel is not the type of market harm that fair use considers.369 On the
other hand, even though this fourth fair use factor is most concerned with the
potential market for, or value of, the work used (here, Büchel’s Training
Ground), the harm to Büchel’s future market due to viewers gaining an inaccurate sense of this art is potentially the type of market harm that fair use
should consider when dealing with a right of integrity claim. 370 Weighing the
four factors of the fair use inquiry seems to support a finding of fair use in this
case.
Putting aside whether the beribboned geese actually harmed the artist’s
honor and reputation, it is harder to find fair use in the facts of Snow v. Eaton
Centre.371 As a preliminary matter, what artistic, social, political, or expressive message is the shopping center trying to send by tying red ribbons around
Snow’s geese sculptures?372 In mid-1982, the marketing director for Eaton
Centre, a shopping mall, began planning its decoration in anticipation of the
Christmas shopping season.373 Part of the decoration involved tying large red
ribbons on the necks of the sixty geese sculptures and creating an advertising
campaign, including posters, shopping bags, banners, centered on the beribboned geese.374 Instead of using Snow’s sculptures to express an artistic
message, the Eaton Centre’s purpose for using Snow’s sculptures was commercial—to promote the shopping center and the holiday shopping season.375
The Eaton Centre did not transform the meaning of Snow’s sculptures to send
an artistic, political, or social message, and its commercial purpose likely

369. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“[b]iting criticism [that
merely] suppresses demand” is not a cognizable harm under the Copyright Act (alterations in original)
(quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 1986))); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144,
1154 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“In many cases, the most effective tool of ridiculing a public figure . . . is
through that person’s own creations. This is particularly true where a person’s fame derives from that
person’s expressive works, as the case often is with artists, musicians, authors, and the like. The First
Amendment demands that these public figures be open to ridicule, just as their works should be.”).
370. See Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 432
(2009) (“[A]rt is uniquely vulnerable to financial diminution through denigration or mutilation, because each art piece is a powerful advertisement for all the artist’s works. Similarly, unauthorized
modification of a work can impair the artist’s stature, diluting the perceived esteem of her entire body
of creative output.”).
371. See Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.).
372. See generally supra note 84.
373. See generally Eastwood, supra note 84.
374. Id.
375. Id.

651

[Vol. 47: 601, 2020]

Creative Destruction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

weighs against fair use under the first fair use factor.376 The second377 and
third378 factors of § 107 also weigh against a finding of fair use due to the
Eaton Centre’s use of all of Snow’s sixty geese sculptures and the highly expressive nature of Snow’s work.379 Based on the facts of this case, the last
factor is equipoised.380 While certain art experts testified that the red ribbons
made “a mockery of [the work’s] intended purpose by distorting its appearance, transforming it into a ‘kitschy’ sentimental display, resembling a Christmas bauble,” another expert testified that the red ribbons around the geese
presented a “‘joyful Christmas statement,’ and that his favourable opinion of
Snow was not in any way affected on seeing the work.”381 Balancing the factors in this case would likely find that the Eaton Centre’s distortion and display of Snow’s sculptural work was not fair.
While current interpretations of the right of integrity seem to exclude
from its reach temporary or impermanent mutilations of works, this exclusion
has the potential to be arbitrary, especially where there is a thin line between
temporary versus permanent mutilations of works, and where the impermanent mutilation of an author’s work can cause the same prejudice to an author’s honor and reputation as the permanent mutilation of the author’s work.
Furthermore, under an expanded moral rights legislation, where moral rights
might apply to works other than single or limited-edition works of visual art,
the line between permanent mutilation and impermanent mutilation would no
longer hold.382 Instead of drawing an artificial line between permanent versus
impermanent mutilations, perhaps some of these circumstances may be better
examined under the doctrine of fair use, excusing a follow-on creator where
the follow-on work uses the author’s work to express a new artistic, social, or

376. Id.; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“The fact
that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use. ‘[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))).
377. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012) (stating the second factor as “the nature of the copyrighted work”).
378. Id. § 107(3) (stating the third factor as “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”).
379. See Eastwood, supra note 84.
380. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (stating the fourth factor as “the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work”).
381. See Eastwood, supra note 84.
382. See supra Section II.B. For instance, how does one distinguish between a “permanent” versus
an “impermanent” mutilation of a song? Or a text? Or a movie?
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political message.
C. Permanent Mutilation of Original or Limited-Edition Works
The most difficult case to make for fair use is in the context of a followon creator who permanently distorts, mutilates, or modifies an original or limited-edition copy of an artist’s work in order to make an artistic, social, or
political statement. For the reasons discussed in Section II.A, it is difficult to
imagine a situation where the destruction of an original work, or a limitededition work, could be excused under fair use. However, there are important
social and political messages that can only be expressed through the mutilation of an original or limited-edition work.383 In fact, as Amy Adler explained,
“there is an artistic value in modifying, defacing[,] and even destroying unique
works of art.”384
An example of mutilating an original work in order to send a political or
social message is the “creative destruction” of colonialist or racist monuments.385 Instead of removing racist monuments in New Orleans, which may
signal a repudiation of America’s racist past but may also effectively erase
America’s racist history, Adler advocates for the creative destruction of racist
monuments, in other words “to ‘create’ a new work by vandalizing the monument.”386 An example of creative destruction occurred when vandals defaced a racist Civil War-era sculpture in New Orleans with anti-racist graffiti.387 The same concept of creative destruction can also apply to
contemporary works. A recent example involved conceptual artist Sam Durant who created a sculpture, Scaffold, which was erected in the Walker Art
Center’s sculpture garden in Minneapolis in 2016.388 Scaffold was an unpainted wood-and-metal sculpture, more than fifty-feet tall, that included

383. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 27, at 287 (“The interest in destruction is so pervasive in contemporary art that, in 2002, French critic Bruno Latour declared: ‘Art has become a synonym for the destruction of art.’ In fact, . . . the defining feature of contemporary art has been its at-tack on the coherence of ‘art’ as a category. In this light, physical attacks against art objects can be understood as
particularly valuable forms of expression. Moral rights law therefore rests on a vision of art at odds
with contemporary art practice. The law obstructs rather than enables the creation of art.”).
384. Id. at 279.
385. See id. at 280.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Sheila Dickinson, ‘A Seed of Healing and Change’: Native Americans Respond to Sam Durant’s ‘Scaffold’, ARTNEWS (June 5, 2017), http://www.artnews.com/2017/06/05/a-seed-of-healing-
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stairways allowing visitors to climb to reach a platform.389 The purpose of
Scaffold was to bring awareness to the dark history of Minnesota, where the
largest mass execution occurred in U.S. history when thirty-eight Dakota
Sioux men were hanged in 1862.390 While Durant’s intention was to bring
awareness to “the racial dimension of the criminal justice system in the United
States,”391 Scaffold deeply offended the local Native American communities
“because of the unique context and history of trauma that the surrounding land
inscribed on it and the form of the scaffold.”392 This portrayal of genocide by
a non-Native American artist prompted overwhelming outcry and backlash,
“fueled not only by anger about cultural appropriation of murder but also by
another unfortunate resonance: the current suicide rate among Native American teenagers is the highest of any population in the United States.”393 Durant,
the Walker Art Center, and Dakota Tribal leaders considered various outcomes for Scaffold, which included dismantling it, burning it, or burying it.394
As a commentator acknowledged, “Disposing of artworks and burning them
is a pretty strong statement.”395 Regardless of opinions criticizing the destruction of Scaffold as censorship, or applauding the destruction as culturally sensitive, it is indisputable that the controversy and dialogue surrounding the destruction of Durant’s sculpture led to more awareness and education about the
United States’ past injustices and racial genocide than did Durant’s sculpture
itself.396 Ultimately, Durant acknowledged that “the ways in which this process unfolded allowed me to transform Scaffold with the help of the Dakota

and-change-native-americans-respond-to-sam-durants-scaffold/.
389. Andrea K. Scott, Does An Offensive Sculpture Deserve to be Burned?, NEW YORKER (June 3,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/does-an-offensive-sculpture-deserveto-be-burned.
390. Id.
391. Sam Durant, A Statement From Sam Durant (5.29.17), WALKER NEWS (May 29, 2017),
https://walkerart.org/magazine/a-statement-from-sam-durant-05-29-17.
392. Olga Viso, Why Taking Down Sam Durant’s Scaffold Was the Right Thing to Do, ART
NEWSPAPER (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/comment/why-taking-down-samdurants-scaffold-was-the-right-thing-to-do.
393. Scott, supra note 389; see also Hilarie M. Sheets, Dakota People Are Debating Whether to
Burn ‘Scaffold’ Fragments, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/arts/design/dakota-people-are-debating-whether-to-burn-scaffold-fragments.html?_r=0&module=inline
(“Native American groups denounced the insensitivity of the piece in recalling what they regarded as
an act of genocide . . . .”).
394. Sheets, supra note 393.
395. Id.
396. See Dickinson, supra note 388.

654

[Vol. 47: 601, 2020]

Creative Destruction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

(and the media) into something that will have a far greater impact in society
and be closer to my original intentions than if the work had remained as it was
constructed in the sculpture garden.”397 The parties came to an agreement to
dismantle Scaffold and to bury the dismantled wood in a secret location in
Minnesota.398
In addition to sending a political or social message through the mutilation
of works, artists have also used the mutilation of works to send artistic messages or have created new meaning with their mutilation and follow-on creations. For instance, in 2003, artists Jake and Dinos Chapman shocked the
world when they purchased and destroyed a rare and revered series of limitededition prints by Francisco Goya.399 The prints were Goya’s Disasters of War,
consisting of eighty etchings printed from the artist’s plates.400 The Disasters
of War etchings were inspired by Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and were
“hailed as the ultimate antiwar statement in art.”401 They were so significant
that they inspired Pablo Picasso to create his antiwar painting, Guernica.402
The Chapman brothers systematically went through all eighty of the first-rate,
mint-condition etchings and superimposed colorful clown heads and puppies
on all of the heads of the agonized victims of war.403 The Chapmans titled
their new collection Insult to Injury, whose message was to “proclaim the inadequacy of art as protest.”404 Jonathan Jones, an art critic for The Guardian,
described them as “brilliant and profound . . . [s]omehow, they do not destroy,
but find something new in the Disasters of War[;] . . . [t]hey are given life,
personality, by some very acute drawing, and so it’s not a collision but a collaboration, an assimilation, as they really do seem to belong in the pictures.”405
The Chapmans brothers’ series, One Day You Will No Longer Be Loved,

397. Viso, supra note 392.
398. Sheila M. Eldred, Dakota Plan to Bury, Not Burn, ‘Scaffold’ Sculpture, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/arts/design/dakota-plan-to-bury-not-burn-scaffoldsculpture.html.
399. Jonathan Jones, Look What We Did, GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2003/mar/31/artsfeatures.turnerprize2003.
400. Id.
401. Alan Riding, Goya Probably Would Not Be Amused, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2003), https://www.
nytimes.com/2003/04/06/weekinreview/goya-probably-would-not-be-amused.html.
402. Id.
403. Jones, supra note 399.
404. Riding, supra note 401.
405. Jones, supra note 399.
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was less shocking but equally destructive.406 For this collection, the Chapmans purchased nineteenth century portraits “by unknown artists of unknown
subjects” and altered them.407 The purpose of their follow-on work was to
“highlight[] society’s attitude to the past as irrelevant and not worth remembering. The work is disturbing both because of the sitters decaying face and
because an apparent old master has been defaced. The work reflects the brothers continuing concern with the human preoccupation with mortality . . . .”408
An earlier, but equally shocking, act of creative destruction was Robert
Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing.409 In 1953, Rauschenberg took
a drawing by Willem de Kooning and slowly erased it.410 It took Rauschenberg two months to erase it,411 resulting in a “sheet of paper bearing the faint,
ghostly shadow of its former markings.”412 He then labeled it, matted it, and
framed the work, inscribing below the now-obliterated de Kooning drawing:
Erased de Kooning Drawing, Robert Rauschenberg, 1953.413 The result was
a new piece of work whose fame eventually surpassed many of de Kooning’s
own works.414 To Rauschenberg, it was important that the erased work was
an original work by a significant artist, because the work “depend[ed] on the
fact that he violated not a reproduction of work but an original, and not just
any original, but an original by Willem de Kooning.”415 This was the only
way Rauschenberg could express his message by performing a literal act of
iconoclasm, by expanding what art could be.416 Erasing the best work of the
past expressed the message “that new art might be about its own failure to
achieve greatness, its impotent rebellion against the heroic past[,] . . . art
that . . . [is] about ‘its own destruction.’”417
406. One Day You Will No Longer Be Loved (That It Should Come to This) III, ART FUND,
https://www.artfund.org/supporting-museums/art-weve-helped-buy/artwork/11735/one-day-youwill-no-longer-be-loved-that-it-should-come-to-this-iii (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Adler, supra note 27, at 283.
410. Id.
411. Cain, supra note 261.
412. Adler, supra note 27, at 283.
413. Robert Rauschenberg, Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953, supra note 258.
414. Greg Allen, Erased De Kooning Drawing is Bigger Than It Used to Be, GREG.ORG (Jan. 11,
2012), https://greg.org/archive/2012/01/11/erased-de-kooning-drawing-is-bigger-than-it-used-tobe.html.
415. Adler, supra note 27, at 283.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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These examples support follow-on creators who create new meaning and
artistic expression through the use of another’s work, where that new meaning
can only be expressed through the use of an original or limited-edition work.
Under a fair use analysis, these follow-on creators transformed the originals
by giving them new meaning and by expressing a new message through their
transformations. The original works—sculptures and paintings—were expressive and creative, but the nature of the original works is less important
where the follow-on creator transforms the original work to express a new
meaning or purpose. Similarly, even though the follow-on creators in all of
the examples above used the entireties of the authors’ original works, that use
was necessary to express their artistic, social, or political messages.418 The
final factor of fair use is a more difficult analysis.419 The permanent mutilation, modification, or distortion of the author’s original work certainly seems
like it would harm the market for the author’s work because the original work
no longer exists, but that does not seem to be a consideration for the fair use
doctrine420 or the moral right of integrity.421 As a preliminary matter, by the
time the work is distorted by the follow-on creator, the physical work usually
no longer belongs to the author, so the author has no market rights to their
original work of art.422 The author retains their right to create reproductions
of their original work, and the distortion of the original work might in fact
increase rather than decrease the market value of the author’s reproductions
because the original is no longer available.423 Similarly, the transformative
works described in this context are not generally attributed to the original author. Transformed works are, instead, clearly attributed to the follow-on creator.424 For instance, the Chapman brothers renamed their transformed works

418. See Yonover, supra note 26, at 118 (“[P]arody of a visual art . . . may necessitate a more total
appropriation than a parody of . . . a song or a play.”).
419. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012) (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work . . . .”).
420. See generally id. § 107.
421. See generally id. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012).
422. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 261 (discussing how Willem de Kooning gave Rauschenberg a
drawing, which Rauschenberg then erased and entitled Erased de Kooning); Jones, supra note 399
(explaining that the Chapmans purchased a rare limited-edition series of Goya’s Disasters of War and
subsequently painted onto it).
423. See Adler, supra note 27, at 284 (“Destroying art can be a valuable way of making art. . . . Destruction is not simply an occasionally valuable thing, but rather, a central quality of ‘art’ itself.”).
424. See supra notes 399–417 and accompanying text.
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and attributed those works to themselves,425 and Rauschenberg inscribed his
own name below Erased de Kooning.426 This means that viewers of the follow-on creators’ works will not gain an inaccurate sense of the original author’s work or judge the author’s work on the basis of the transformative
uses.427
Some may argue that, if we were to apply fair use in right of integrity
cases, then what is to stop anyone who destroys or mutilates a work from
claiming that their mutilation, modification, or distortion was fair use? For
instance, what would prevent the developer in Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P.
from claiming that his intent in white-washing the street art on the 5Pointz
warehouse was to give the street art new purpose, message, or meaning?428
Courts have faced similar questions numerous times in the past in infringement and fair use disputes, and have made case-by-case determinations on
when follow-on creators actually transform copyrighted works to give them
new meanings and messages, and when they do not.429 There is no reason that
courts would have difficulty making the same determinations for integrity
claims as they have in countless infringement claims in the past.430 Furthermore, courts do not rely solely on a follow-on creator’s intent to transform;
they examine the follow-on work to determine whether the work expresses a
meaningfully-different message or purpose than the original. An example of
this is the case of Rogers v. Koons.431 Koons testified that his use of Roger’s
photograph of a couple holding a string of puppies was intended as
social criticism . . . to support that proposition that . . . the mass production of commodities and media images has caused a deterioration
in the quality of society, and this artistic tradition of which he is a
member proposes through incorporating these images into works of
art to comment critically both on the incorporated object and the political and economic system that created it.432

425. Jones, supra note 399.
426. Robert Rauschenberg, Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953, supra note 258.
427. See Adler, supra note 27, at 282 (describing one critic’s focus on the Chapman brothers’ “act
of shocking deviance”).
428. 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 434–35 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
429. See discussion supra Section III.A.
430. See discussion supra Section III.A.
431. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
432. Id. at 309.

658

[Vol. 47: 601, 2020]

Creative Destruction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

The court nevertheless found that Koons’s expression in his sculptural work,
String of Puppies, did not transform the meaning, message, or purpose of Rogers’ original photo and was not fair use.433
Take, as another example, one of the first moral right of integrity cases
mentioned in this Paper—the case in Germany where a homeowner, uncomfortable with the nudes in a mural on his wall, hired an artist to paint clothing
on the nudes.434 Painting clothing on nudes is not likely to be considered
transformative for fair use for the same reason the sanitized version of a film
was not considered transformative for fair use in Clean Flicks of Colorado,
LLCs v. Soderbergh.435 Specifically,
Bleeping certain words in the film’s dialogue or using a black bar or
blurring to obscure some nudity in certain frames might . . . not really
add any new purpose, character, expression, meaning[,] or message
to the film, or might only add the message . . . that the movie contains
some content that some people find objectionable.436
Similarly, an owner’s attempt to sell a separated panel from Bernard Buffet’s
compilation work on the refrigerator,437 and the Chicago Park District’s downsizing of Chapman Kelley’s Wildflower Works, 438 are also not likely to be
considered transformative uses for fair use. In the Bernard Buffet case, the
separation and attempt by the owner of the work to sell the refrigerator panels
piece-by-piece was clearly motivated by profit. There was no artistic, social,
or political message to send by selling a section of a work, and the separated
panel did not serve a new purpose or send a new meaning or message by being
separated from the rest. Indeed, this act is similar to cutting up and selling
pieces of a Picasso painting, which VARA’s legislative history indicates
433. Id. at 312.
434. See Merryman, supra note 18, at 1027 n.56 (discussing Reichsgericht [RG] [court of last resort
for civil and criminal matters] June 8, 1912, 79 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN
ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 397 (Ger.)).
435. 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240–43 (D. Colo. 2006).
436. Reese, supra note 210, at 470 (discussing Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238); see also
Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 861 (9th Cir. 2017) (“VidAngel’s service
does not add anything to Plaintiff’s works. It simply omits portions that viewers find objectionable,
and transmits them for the same intrinsic entertainment value as the originals. . . . Although removing
objectionable content may permit a viewer to enjoy a film, this does not necessarily add something
new or change the expression, meaning, or message of the film.” (internal quotations omitted)).
437. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
438. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 2011).
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would clearly violate an author’s right of integrity, 439 and it would create no
new message or meaning. Similarly, Chicago Park District’s downsizing of
Kelley’s Wildflower Works was motivated purely by the need to redevelop
Grant Park to make space for the new Millennium Park.440 The smaller-sized
garden did not send a new message, meaning, or purpose.
Even the case of Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, where the follow-on creator
modified and distorted the cover of a famous comic to send a critical political
message, may not be considered transformative for the purpose of fair use.441
Courts are generally more inclined to find transformative use and, therefore,
fair use where the follow-on work is a parody of the original rather than a
satire that “merely uses [the original work] to get attention or to avoid the
drudgery in working up something fresh.”442 Indeed, the Deckmyn case seems
analogous to the facts in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books. In Dr. Seuss
Enterprises, a follow-on creator used the look, feel, and characters from The
Cat In the Hat to create The Cat Not In The Hat!, a “rhyming summary of
highlights from the O.J. Simpson double murder trial.”443 In that case, the
court found the follow-on creator’s work to be satire instead of parody and
was therefore not transformative for the purpose of fair use.444
Some may argue that recognizing fair use to moral right of integrity
claims invites the destruction of great works of art.445 Take, for instance, the
opening scenario in Joseph Sax’s Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, where
“[a]n eccentric American collector who, for a Saturday evening’s amusement,
invited his friends to play darts using his Rembrandt portrait as the target.”446
Recognizing a fair use limitation to the right of integrity is not likely to encourage this type of behavior. As a preliminary matter, VARA only protects
moral rights of authors who are currently living.447 This would mean that great
works of art by deceased masters would not be protected under VARA in the

439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
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See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 294.
See supra text accompanying notes 79–83.
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1396.
Id. at 1400–01.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
SAX, supra note 58, at 1.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2012).
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first place.448 Second, the destruction of another’s property is still a crime.449
Just because liability under moral rights may be limited by fair use does not
mean it is protected from criminal or civil liability for destruction of property.
For instance, in 1986, self-proclaimed artist Gerard Jan van Bladeren took a
box cutter and slashed Barnett Newman’s American Abstract Expressionist
masterpiece, Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III, hanging in the
Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam.450 Bladeren claimed that Newman’s painting was “a kind of cultural provocation” that “called for a reaction and got
one.”451 In spite of his claimed artistic gesture, Bladeren served five months
in jail and three months on parole for his destruction.452 Similarly, in 2014,
Miami artist Maximo Caminero picked up one of artist Ai Weiwei’s Chinese
urns at the Perez Art Museum Miami and smashed it.453 Caminero claimed
that he smashed the vase as a “spontaneous protest.”454 Specifically, he saw
Ai Weiwei’s photos behind the vases featuring Weiwei dropping and destroying an ancient Chinese vase “as a provocation by Weiwei to join him in an act
of performance protest.”455 Putting aside the analysis of whether this act of
destruction would be considered fair use, Caminero’s act was certainly a crime
(and civil tort) for which he was arrested.456 Finally, fair use is not likely to
encourage owners of original or limited-edition works to destroy their own
valuable properties or works of art. Owners of valuable works would be deterred from mutilating, distorting, or modifying their own property by the economic consequences of those actions. Unless they feel strongly the need to
send a new and important artistic, political, or social message through the mutilation of their valuable property, most owners of valuable works tend to want
to preserve their works and the economic values in their works rather than

448. Id.
449. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594(a) (West 2019).
450. Carol Vogel, Dutch Vandal Slashes Museums’ Confidence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1997),
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/27/arts/dutch-vandal-slashes-museums-confidence.html.
451. The Many Deaths of a Painting, 99% INVISIBLE (Mar. 26, 2019), https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/the-many-deaths-of-a-painting/.
452. Vogel, supra note 450. Bladeren struck again in 1997 when he slashed another one of Newman’s works, Cathedra, which was worth $12 million. Id.
453. Krishnadev Calamur, In Act of Protest, Ai Weiwei Vase Is Destroyed At Miami Museum, NPR
(Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/02/18/279050608/in-act-of-protestai-weiwei-vase-in-destroyed-at-miami-museum.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. (stating that Caminero was “charged with criminal mischief”).
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commit waste.457
V. CONCLUSION
The moral right of integrity protects an author’s right to prevent any distortion, modification, or mutilation of their work that prejudices their honor
and reputation.458 At the same time, fair use allows follow-on creators to
transform the meaning or message of an author’s work to express a new meaning or message, and “the public has moral entitlements to reuse and alter . . . cultural artifacts made by others.”459 Even though the text of VARA
explicitly includes language subjecting the moral right of integrity to copyright’s fair use limitation, there have been no cases in the United States applying § 107’s fair use factors to balance an author’s interest with the public’s
moral entitlement.460 The lack of case law interpreting how courts might balance an author’s moral right of integrity with follow-on creators’ and the public’s rights to expression is particularly troubling in light of the ongoing discussion to expand moral rights in the United States. If moral rights are to be
expanded, most interest groups, industry groups, and commentators agree that
those rights must be subject to fair use.461 However, without any guidance
from courts, and with commentators and legislative history doubting the compatibility of fair use with the right of integrity, how can the United States expand moral rights with the assumption that fair use would provide the balance
between authors’ rights and the public’s rights? This Paper examines past
integrity cases to envision how fair use could be interpreted and applied to
these various cases and contexts.462 Courts need not restrict the scope of fair
use to give the moral right of integrity meaning. It is clear from the analysis
in this Paper that copyright’s fair use doctrine is flexible enough to serve as a
limitation on an author’s moral right of integrity, and the four fair use factors
may be used to balance the author’s rights with the public’s rights to find fair
use where a follow-on creator modifies, distorts, or mutilates an author’s work

457. But cf. Edward J. Damich, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing a French case where an artist “slashed
and th[rew] away some of his paintings,” then someone found and restored the paintings and put them
up for auction; when the artist learned about the sale, “he demanded that the paintings be destroyed”).
458. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012).
459. Gordon, supra note 156, at 1.
460. See supra Part II.
461. See supra Section II.B.
462. See supra Part III.
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to transform the work and give the work new meaning or to express a political,
social, or artistic message.
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